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SALES BELOW COST PROHIBITIONS: PRIVATE PRICE
FIXING UNDER STATE LAW
ALTHOUGH a free market is vital to free enterprise, competitors exposed
to forces of that market are prone, as Adam Smith was only the first to
observe,1 to devise schemes for market regulation even while they exalt the
theoretical virtues and practical desirability-in other industries-of mar-
kets which are free. Among the most recent, and in some areas the most
effective, of such schemes has been the enactment in thirty-one states 2 of
statutes which forbid the sale of goods at less than cost 3 and which place
1. 1 Smr, VEALTH oF NATioNs 135-6,264-5 (Rogers' ed. 1869).
2. Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Idaho, Kan., Ky., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Mont., Neb., N. H., N. J., N. D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., R. I., Tenn., Utah, Va.,
Wash., IV. Va., Wisc., Wyo. (see statutory citations at note 76 infra).
3. See generally 1 CALLmAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPTmoN xND TRADE MARKS
§§ 27.2-27.7 (1945); GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION (1939);
OpiPENHEIM, RECENT PRICE CONTROL LAWS (1939).
As a price control device, the statutes prohibiting sales below cost (commonly desig-
nated as "Unfair Practices" or "Unfair Sales" Acts) resemble the state "fair trade" (resale
price maintenance) laws specifically sanctioned under federal law by the Miller-Tydings
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enforcement of this prohibition in private hands. In demonstrating a loss
of faith in the ability of an "unseen hand" to guide a complex economy, the
statutes may seem to take their place beside other depression-stimulated
legislative controls which have been imposed on the operation of the market.
4
But they are markedly dissimilar in that they do not provide for public
policing of a particular evil produced by free competition,5 but instead allow
private groups to regulate free market forces over an indefinite area. Since,
in the main, our economy still relies on competitive controls, and the federal
anti-trust laws embody a dominant public policy in favor of competitive
prices and unrestricted production, such statutes represent a departure
which is both economically undesirable and of questionable constitutionalit'.
The statutes have their origin in recurrent attempts of competitors to
prevent "destructive" price competition. The most obvious means of limit-
ing such competition is the price-fixing agreement among competitors, but
this has been categorically held to violate the Sherman Act.6 No remedy was
provided at common law against injuries sustained from price reductions,
whatever their purpose,7 and the emerging judge-made law of unfair com-
Amendment to the Sherman Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1940). The fair trade
laws, however, deal only with branded goods, permitting vertical contracts between buyer
and seller which require resale at designated prices, while the unfair practices acts limit price
reductions horizontally in all types of goods, whether or not affected by contracts concerning
resale. See FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1945); HANDLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 1091-5 (1937).
Although viewed legally as a protection of the brand name owner's interest, the resale
price maintenance mechanism is realistically described as "a transparent mask ... to
conceal .. .prohibition of price competition." Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law
of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607, 615 (1940). And see Note,
Monopolistic Competition and the Fair Trade Acts, 14 TmiP. L.Q. 95 (1939).
Sales-below-cost prohibitions also resemble prohibitions against price discriminations
between areas, types of buyers, etc., contained in numerous state laws (sometimes as one
part of an Unfair Practices Act) and in the Robinson-Patman Act. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1940). (Id. § 3 forbids, inter alia, sale of goods at "unreasonably low prices
for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.") But all these other
mechanisms are beyond the scope of this Comment.
4. See Boulding, In Defense of Monopoly, 59 Q.J.EcoN. 524 (1945).
5. From a number of possible examples, public regulation of agricultural marketing,
securities exchanges, utilities, commodities such as coal, oil, and milk, and terms and condi-
tions of labor may be mentioned.
6. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S,
150 (1940); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
7. Cases run back to The School Master Case, Y.B. 11 Hen. IV 47, Pl. 21 (1410), in
which cut rates for teaching instituted by newcomers were held no ground for a writ of
trespass. And it was said in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111, 134 (Mass, 1842), that a
baker injured by another's price reductions would similarly be denied relief; through such
competition, "the best interests of trade . ..are promoted." Reselling, at prices below
cost, goods purchased from the plaintiff was held no ground for action in Ajello v. Worsley,
[1898] 1 Ch. 274. And Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 HARV. L, REv.
139, 157 (1913) recognized that common law "relief against injurious price cutting would
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petition, based on tort conceptions, has dealt only with the limited instance in
which price cutting is maliciously directed against a particular competitor8
be novel." For a full summary of the common law views, see Kent Stores v. Wilentz, 14 F.
Supp. 1, 6-8 (D.NJ. 1936), and cases collected in Notes, 47 YALE L.J. 1201, 1206 (1938); 52
HARv. L. Rv. 1142, 1146-7 (1939); 1941 Wxs. L. REv. 425, 430; 15 Miss. L. J. 213-216
(1943).
8. The classic Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 NAV. 946 (1909) held good against
demurrer a complaint alleging that a wealthy banker, failing to secure plaintiff barber as
tenant, had opened a nearby barbershop and %as maliciously driving plaintiff out of busi-
ness by methods of which selling below cost was one. Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152
Iowa 618, 132 NAV. 371 (1911), followed Tuttle v. Buck in holding Standard liable for under-
taking retail competition with the "malicious purpose" of driving plaintiff out of business.
Contrast the earlier Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry-Goods Co., 105 Fed. 163
(C.C.A. 8th 1900), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 617 (1901), (allegedly willful and malicious attempts
to put plaintiff out of business or injure him by offering his products at unprofitable prices
held lawful). And see 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LiATBILITy 358-61 (1906).
Engaging in business for the purpose of eliminating another is described as unlawful,
but the use of predatory price cutting, though "harsh," is considered darr.um abseuc injuria
by the RESTATEmENT, TORTS, §§ 708-9 (1938). But cf. Master Barbers' Ass'n v. Baiata
(Ill. Super. Ct. 1935, cited in Fathchild, Statutory Unfair Compelition, 1 Mo. L. Rzv. 20, 25
(1936)) (price cutting, engaged in without malice and by one who had not engaged in business
to eliminate competitors, enjoined as unfair competition at common law; injunction sus-
tained without opinion in appeal from contempt order, 304 Ill. App. 252, 26 N.E.2d 187
(1940)). Probably most courts dealing with price cutting would not go so far as the Master
Barbers' case in extending the doctrine of unfair competition. See statements in State v.
Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938) (Unfair Practices Act held to prohibit sales below
cost in which both malice and a desire to gain were present--sales, therefore, "which at
common law would be entirely innocent" because not wholly inspired by malice); Potter
Press v. C. W. Potter, Inc., 303 Mass. 485, 494, 22 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1939) (price cutting to
levels below cost declared to be a "lawful form of competition" prior to advent of the Unfair
Sales Act); Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App.2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935) (sales below cost to cap-
ture competitor's customers, though "ruthless, or unfair, in a moral sense," were not illegal).
And see Remington-Rand v. Master-Craft, 67 F.2d 218, 221 (C.C.A.6th 1933) (price cutting
held lawful because not "an element in a scheme to trade unfairly," but a mere result of
"ordinary rivalry in business.")
Viewing unfair competition as a branch of tort law has involved the doctrinal attempt
to explain what conduct is unlawful by employing the "omnibus doctrine" of justification.
Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REv. 582, 584 (1935). All competitive activity
causes some injury; but, in this view, most of it is "justified" because, as Holmes put it, the
law adopts "the economic postulation that free competition is worth more to society than it
costs." (Priqlege, 1alice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3 (1894)). Thus it has been declared
that "if . . . trade is invaded in the course of fair competition there is a recognized justifica-
tion; while there is no valid excuse in the case of unfair competition." Wnvs., CONROL OF
THE MARKET 27 (1911). And see 1 C.ALLMAq, op. cit. supra, note 3, §§ 5-6 (1945) for the
proposition that the law distinguishes between conduct which is "aggressive" and that
which is merely "competitive." See further, Callman, What is Unfair Competition?, 28 G o.
L.J. 585 (1940). The language of "justification," of course, is not at all helpful in determin-
ing what is, or ought to be, considered unjustified (see Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV.
L. REv. 1289, 1302-4 (1940); Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 74 Ad. 595 (1909)), and the sug-
gested category of "aggressive" conduct, (said to be appropriate only to areas of legitimized
struggle, such as the boxing ring) seems no more promising. In fact, except in the rare case
19481
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Actions by the Federal Trade Commission ' and suits under state and
federal anti-trust laws 10 have demonstrated that price cutting can be un-
lawful, but the direction of these cases has been toward reaching only those
examples of price reductions which form part of a scheme of market domina-
tion, i.e. in which low prices are intended to drive others from the market
and pave the way for monopoly. Such attacks on low prices ignore the in-
cidental injury caused to other sellers when one competitor cuts prices in
response to normal market pressures.
Faced with this situation, therefore, competitors seeking to limit the play
of free market prices have turned to such schemes as cost protection, the
influence of which has extended to notions of business ethics, to trade asso-
ciation activities and the FTC's Trade Practice Conferences, to the NRA,
and, in the current phase, to the present state legislation. Under this theory,
every fair-dealing enterprise is entitled, and even obliged, to sell its product
at a price which adequately covers all its costs; any lower price is branded
as an unfair, "chiseling" attack on other sellers 1 or as a vicious attempt to
fool the public.12 For the theory to operate successfully, there must be
of actual malice such as Tuttle v. Buck,-what Holmes called "disinterested malevolence,"
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350 (1921)-the
whole tort concept seems inapplicable to the particular injuries caused by competitive price
reductions, which a free enterprise system assumes will be inflicted, wherever possible, in
the interest of lower prices. It seems more practical to define what price cutting is unlawful
and "predatory" by relation to the effect of any given conduct on the market in which it is
used. Such an approach would afford relief to injured competitors when price cutting,
whether directed at them or not, injures the free market by a sufficiently dangerous tendency
to restrain trade or create a monopoly. This treatment attaches much more importance
than have the cases, at least in their reasoning, to who the price-cutter is, and what threat
his activity carries to the continued existence of competitive prices. See notes 27, 30 ilfra.
Compare with the above approaches an attempt in Moon v. Clark, 192 Ga. 47, 14
S.E.2d 481 (1941) to deal with the problem of sale below cost (no statute involved) in terms
of public nuisance.
9. See note 28 infra.
10. See note 27 infra.
11. The force and effect of this theory, even without statutory encouragement, is in-
dicated in Meyerson v. Hurlbut, 98 F.2d 232, 233 (App. D.C. 1938), in which it was held
slander per se for defendant to have said: "Meyerson has been cutting prices . .. the sold]
below cost, just to hold the business .... " The court noticed "the familiar fact that the
practice of selling goods below cost has come in recent years to be widely and sharply con-
demned as harmful."
12. It is on this ground that "loss leaders" have usually been attacked. The leader,
featuring some low price to attract the customers' attention, was called by Brandeis a "mis-
leader, because ordinarily the very purpose of the cut-price is to create a false impression
[of general economies] . ..." Brandeis, Preventing Standardized Prices, quoted in WExGEL,
THE FAIR TRADE ACTS, 82 (1938). Brandeis feared the use of such devices would eliminate
the small entrepreneur. BRANDEIS, BusiNss-A PROFESSION (1914). And see SELIGMAN
AND LovE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 143-62 (1932), emphasizing the effect
of interdependent prices on leader selling. Actually, however, both the extent of the use of
[Vol. 57: 391
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agreement on what constitutes "cost." 13 "Accounting principles" do not
answer this problem; 14 accountants themselves differ widely " as to proper
loss leaders and the harm which they cause have received little careful inquiry, and remain
largely speculative. The term itself amounts to little more than an epithet, Nelson, Trade
Practice Conference Rules and te Consumer, 8 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 452, 460 (1940); fre-
quently it refers not to sales below invoice cost but to sales below what is considered a proper
mark-up. ZORN AND FELDMAN, BusINxss UNaR TEE NEW PRICE LAws 263-74 (1937).
And see note 26 infra.
13. See PATON, ESSENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING 78-9 (1938); VI. Sicimc, CosT ACcoUNT-
ING 5 (1938) ("there is no such thing as an exact cost"). Tannenbaum, Cost Under the Unfair
Practices Acts, 9 STUDIES IN Bus. ADu'N in 12 J. Bus. U. OF Cm. No. 2 at 16 (1939) states that
to speak of the cost of a product with certainty is an impossibility. "The purpose in hand
determines . .. [its] nature . .."
Addressing the National Association of Cost Accountants in early NRA days, Mr. Nel-
son Gaskill called for "uniformity of method and of understanding among cost accountants,"
to eliminate "disparity in cost and price arising out of methods of accounting" used by
different industries, or different firms within an industry. NATLOAL AssocIATION OF COsr
ACcouNTANTs, YEAR BOOK 174 (1933). The problem still exists. See Hertzler, What Costs
for Price Control?, N.A.C.A. YEAR BooK 97, 102 (1945).
14 "[I]t .. . [is] possible to have several different costs . .. [estimated] in accord-
ance with accepted cost accounting theory and practice. . . ." VAN- SICKLE, op. ci. sulpra
note 13. And see WVienshienk, Accountants and the Law, 96 U. OF PA.L.REv. 48 (1947).
15. Professor Paton, in viewing sales below cost prohibitions as "artificial price-fixing
in terms of . .. artificial cost calculations," has stated that reconciliation of "the various
concepts of cost and methods of measuring costs .. . looks like a hopeless task." Costs and
Profits in Present-Day Accounting, 16 N.A.C.A. BULLETIN 123, 139 (1934). Other account-
ing authorities have been equally perplexed; the following exchange occurred at the Assoca-
tion of Cost Accountants' June, 1933, meeting:
Chairman Marsh: It seems . ..we are ... confused a little in connection w.ith
pricing. . . .The requirement is that you shall not be permitted to sell below costs.
Dr. Reitell: I am afraid you do not see the picture.
Chairman Marsh: Don't ask me what cost is.
Dr. Reitell: I should like to see [costs] discussed for an industry, if you please.
N.A.C.A. YEAR BOOK 84 (1933). (Emphasis added.)
To many businessmen, however, "a cost system is not a high-sounding bit of chicane;
it is an honest portrayal of what they conceive to be their 'true' costs." HAMILTO. AND
TILL, Tim COST FORMULA FOR PRICE 37 (Report 9, NRA Committee on Price Policy, 1935).
And in People v. Kahn, 19 Cal. App.2d 758, 765, 60 P.2d 596, 599 (1936), a case arising
under California's Unfair Practices Act, the court declared the problem was "a factual one,
that of discovering the cost, as a truth." When another California court later protested
that no standard was provided in the sales-below-cost prohibition for determining deprecia-
tion, measuring values, or limiting the types of expenses to which "cost" referred, Balzer v.
Caler, 74 P.2d 839 (Cal. App. 1937), the appellate court overlooked the problem 11 Cal.2d
663, 82 P.2d 19 (1938) and the writer of a Note, 47 YALE. L. J. 1201, 1204 (1938) suggested
that the "meaning [of cost] is articulated in reasonably objective systems of cost account-
ing." In State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 365, 84 P.2d 767, 779 (1938), the court held a "rea-
sonable interpretation" of cost in the Unfair Competition Act was "what business men
generally mean [by cost] .. . arrived at by a reasonable rule."
Basically, the questions presented by sales-below-cost prohibitions involve (a) whose
cost-that of the individual producer, a theoretical or observed marginal producer, or an
average somehow derived? and (b) what costs--i.e., given the unit or average under(a),
what elements should be included in the calculation, and on what assumptions? See Cam-
man, Costs in the Determination of Selling Prices, 66 J. AccouNTANcY 7,12-6 (1938).
1948]
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methods of valuing assets,16 of assigning general expenses to particular
products and periods, 17 and of computing other elements of cost. Uniform
accounting procedures and prima facie presumptions of cost have, therefore,
formed a vital part of cost protection schemes, both to establish a common
definition of cost among competitors and, in practice, to fix these costs at a
level which will insure sufficiently high prices.'"
THE COST PROTECTION PRINCIPLE: ECONOMIC FACT OR FALLACY?
The beguilingly simple proposition that prices should provide for the pro-
ducer's cost may seem sound upon its face; given the equilibrium assump-
16. Although the lower of cost or market value is considered the usual method of valu-
ing current assets, GRAHAM AND KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE 198, 204 (1938),
there is much divergence of view, based on the desire to reflect a realistic current value,
May, The Future of the Balance Sheet, 84 J. ACCOUNTANCY 98 (1947); PATON, ADVANCED Ac-
COUNTING, 138--60 (1941); and see note 57(a) infra. And where inventory cannot be traced
piece by piece, varying methods of determining what charges shall be made to inventory
for the stocks sold, such as "last-in, first-out," "first-in, first-out," or weighted average,
produce differing reports of "cost" for the period. Paton, op. cit. supra. As to fixed assets,
although the balance sheet and depreciation rates are generally based on original cost
(GRAHAM AND KATZ, op. cit. supra at 224), the same demand exists for showing (and de-
preciating) a replacement value which is generally higher than original cost. But the in-
clusion of such depreciation rates as an expense, in order to replace the asset at current
prices (as regulated utilities were generally allowed to do), causes an overstatement of costs,
See Kripke, Accountants' Financial Statements and Fact-Finding in the Law of Corporate
Regulation, 50 YALJE L.J. 1180, 1195-6 (1941).
17. Often such assignment of "costs" is wholly arbitrary, as where a seasonal enterprise
sells some goods in the off-season, where scrap or waste of some value is produced in opera-
tions, or where one product, such as cotton-seed, is necessarily produced by processing the
principal product, cotton. See Fox, Joint-Product Costs, 15 N.A.C.A. BULL. 915-35 (1934).
18. Uniform procedures have the magical effect of freezing into fixed elements of cost,
which all competitors will procede to collect in the market, such expenses as advertising,
distribution, or an owner's salary-items which would normally vary with the fortunes of
the enterprise, and which are not rightfully part of the "cost" of the product. Hamilton,
Cost as a Standard of Price, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 321, 331-2 (1937). As to whether
"cost" should include expenses of advertising and distribution, compare Weld, Why Market.
ing Cost Should Be Part of Production Costs, 165 PRINTERS' INK 6"3 (Oct. 19, 1933) with Falk,
Marketing Cost Does Not Belong in Minimum Prices, 165 PRINTERS' INK 63 (Oct, 12, 1933).
A recent writer concludes, "All costs are important in [fixing] . . . selling prices. . . . A
cost system which covers merely production costs is only half a cost system." Greer, Cost
Requirements of a Competitive Economy, N.A.C.A. YEAR BOOK 101, 117 (1944).
Fully developed uniform accounting systems dirbcted toward price "stabilization"
have included not only distribution costs, but interest charges on funds borrowed or in-
vested in the enterprise, depreciation on fully depreciated but productive facilities (not in-
frequently at a replacement cost value), and even state and federal income tax payments.
PEARCE, TRADE ASSOCIATION SURVEY, 260-78 (TNEC Monograph 18, 1941). For an un-
conscious declaration of the value of uniform accounting in stabilizing prices, see Halligan,
The Relation of Uniform Cost Accounting to Competition, 139 ANNALS 74, 77 (1928) ("... a
company may actually believe its low quotation . . . warranted by low cost when, if . . .
uniform accounting . . . [is] followed, . . . a loss may be the result . . ."---so the 'low
quotation' would be raised).
[Vol. 57 :391
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tions of supply and demand economics, prices over the long run should in-
deed tend to allow for the total costs of all producers, and for competitive
profits as well. 19 But this equilibrium exists only in the long run, when all
resources are properly allocated in accordance with productivity. It is not
intended to be a norm for day-to-day price policy. In the short run, the way
in which resources are in fact to be guided by the market to their most
economic uses is precisely by prices which are either above costs (thus at-
tracting more resources to the short areas), or below costs (thus tending to
drive resources out of the less economic areas). Prices in the short run are
thus governed primarily by demand factors-consumers' choices among
alternative ways of spending their money. Independent producers adjust
to such market prices as best they may in the light of their internal cost
conditions, carrying forward production so long as marginal revenue ex-
ceeds marginal cost. The idea of freezing prices at the level of cost prevents
the market from performing its chief social function-guiding the allocation
of resources according to criteria of productivity and consumer demand.
-The principle is likewise indefensible where imperfect competition pre-
vails. 2 1 Under such conditions-which many economists have contended
are the more typical 2 -productive facilities are allowed to remain idle if
greater profits are thereby attainable. Nevertheless, except for the situa-
tions of monopoly or oligopoly, there is a continuing pressure from in-
dividual producers, which increases with their number and their lesser
significance in the market, to make use of this idle capacity by making a
price appeal and obtaining greater volume. The producing group can meet
these pressures and maintain a non-competitive price only if some method
can be found to keep wayward price-cutters in line behind a common price
front.23 An effective cost protection scheme can provide this restraint by
19. HE'DERSON, SUPPLY AND DE,.NiAND 54 (1922); FRASER, Ecoxoinc THouGHT ,
LAGUAcE 107 (1937); Hicxs AND HART, THE SocIL FRAMEWORK OF TE AnERI nuAx
ECONOmy (1945) passir. For one of the early attempts to justify cost protection on a
theoretical basis, see EDDY, THE NEW CoIIPETrrioN, 256-8 (4th ed. 1915).
20. In this sense, the "cost-of-production basis for fixing prices .. .is based on an
antiquated theory of value [and] . .. is theoretically untenable." Backman, Cost of Pro-
duction as a Basis of Price Fixing, 66 J. AccouvrANcY 143, 153 (1938). For the best general
statement, see Hamilton, Cost as a Standard of Price, 4 LAW & CoN.isp. PRoD. 321 (1937).
The "general application (of a cost-recovery theory of prices) as a cure-all for industrial ills"
is described as "economic quackery" in HA .LTON Arm TILL, THE CosT FormULA FOR
PRxcE 76 (Report 9, NRA Committee on Price Policy, 1935).
21. See MILLER, UNFAIRCOMPETITION 359-96 (1941).
22. See among others: CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITrO;
(5th ed., 1946); BURNs, THE DEcLiN. OF COMPTITI-ON (1936); HI-wuro,, Picn , %zD
PRIcE PoLiciEs (1938) and THE PATTERN OF CoMPETiTIoN (1940); ARNOLD, TIE BOrrLE-
NEcKS OF BusnTss (1940); NELSON AND KEMI, PRICE BEhAVIOR AND BuSIT.SS POLICY
(TNEC Monograph 1, 1941); Am. EcoN. Ass'x, READINGS IN THE SOCIAL CoNTRoL. oF
INDUSTRY (1942).
23. WiLcox, ComPETITioN AND MONOPOLY IN AmERIC.N IN-DUSTRY, cc. II, V (TNEC
Monograph 21, 1940). That groups of sellers can obtain greater net returns from prices
19481
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requiring that prices be based on a cost reflecting the less-than-capacity
operation.2 4 Since the fixed costs of maintaining unused capacity create
higher unit costs for the units which are produced, such a scheme prices
some purchasers out of the market and forces those who can afford the
higher price to pay either for unproductive equipment or, in the distributive
trades, for an excessive number of outlets. And such a restriction of con-
sumer purchasing power may well have the additional effect of contributing
to the severity of the business cycle.25 To require prices which invariably
insure a return for costs, therefore, is to foster the twin evils of high prices
and low production.
26
above the competitive level is due to a relative inelasticity of many demand situations, in
which, subject to the competition of other types of goods, revenues are not proportionately
reduced by a rise in prices. See CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 22.
24. See NouisE, PRICE MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY 372 el. seg. (1944); How are Indus.
trial Prices Developed?, N.A.C.A. YEAR BOOK 8, 19 (1939). Dr. Nourse has emphasized and
deplored the tendency, encouraged by uniform methods of cost calculation, to compute
costs at assumed "standard" rates of production, far below capacity, even though actual
production may be much higher. Cost Finding and Price Determination, N.A.C.A. YEAR
Boox 27 (1945). And see WnLcox, op. cit. supra note 23, at 273-4.
25. MEANS, INDUSTRIAL PR.CES AND THEIR RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY, SEN. Doc.
No. 13, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); Edwards, The Relation of Price Policy to Fluctuations of
Investment, 28 Am. EcoN. REv. Supp. 56 (1938); HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY AND BusiN.ss
CYCLES (1941), and Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth in READINGS IN
BusINEss CYCLE THEORY 366, 380-1 (Am. Econ. Ass'n 1944); Simons, Economic Stability and
Antitrust Policy, 11 U. OF Cl. L. REV. 338 (1944); and see Nourse, op. cit. supra note 24.
26. A common reason given to justify the cost protection idea is the necessity to curb
"loss leaders." See note 12 supra, and assertion in Note, 14 TrEri. L.Q. 95, 111 (1939).
Though it was once contended that loss leaders in a single year (1929) accounted for
'three to five billion dollars in retail sales (BLOOMFIELD, TRENDS IN RETAIL DISTRIBUTION
329 (1930), one of the few studies of the problem found that in 1928 less than one-fifth of the
stores surveyed used leaders to any degree. FTC, CHAIN STORES: CHAIN STORE LEADERS
AND Loss LEADERS, 20 (1932). There is some indication, moreover, that as the chains which
were thought to employ loss leaders most widely have grown in size, (see HOFFIAN, LARGE
SCALE ORGANIZATION IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIES, 71, 79-83, TNEC Monograph 35,1940) they
have abandoned their cut-rate emphasis and found it to their greater interest to support
price stabilization. See MACK, CONTROLLING RETAILERS 72-3 (1936). As early as 1931, the
president of the American Food Institute stated "Each chain knows that its quotations will
be . . . met by . . . the other chains. This . . . has turned men's minds towards other
methods. . . ." Address by Gordon C. Corbaly, BOSTON CONFERENCE Ox RETAIL DIS-
TRIBUTION 97 (1930). And see suggestions to this effect in Comment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 816,
847 (1938). The sales below cost recently found to have been practiced by certain retail
divisions of the A. & P., in United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.
626, 639-42, 664, 678 (E.D. Ill. 1946) were not individual loss leader sales, but amounted to
book losses by retail units which were directed to achieve larger volume, and these logses
were held one element of an overall scheme to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
Loss leaders may, in fact, 'allow for desirable variation in otherwise rigid price struc-
tures. See LYON, THE ECON031CS OF FREE DEALS 121 (1933). Their common prohibition in
NRA codes was opposed by the NRA Trade Practice Committee, which felt additional proof
of their actual effects should be shown. LYON, THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADNIINISTRATIbN
600-2, 733-4 (1935). Thus, it would seem of dubious wisdom to adopt cost-protection as a
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Admittedly, there is a danger to competitive markets and to other sellers
when sales below cost are employed by powerful units in order to destroy
their competitors. But proceedings under state and federal anti-trust laws -"
remedy for a condition whose evils have yet to be proved. The possible effect of the adoption
of the scheme is shown by an FTC survey described in the REPORT Ox RrSALE PnrcE Mnm-
TENAXcE 861-2 (1945), which found that retail leader prices in southern California prior to
adoption of the state Unfair Practices Act were seldom if ever below invoice cost, but the
effect of the Act was to increase prices of many items not previously employed as leaders.
27. State actions: Under the Nebraska anti-trust law a large interstate utility was en-
joined from underselling, at rates below cost, a smaller local competitor. State ex rel. Spill-
man v. Interstate Power Co., 118 Neb. 756, 226 NAN. 427 (1929). And in State v. Atlantic
Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 742, 188 S.E. 412 (1936), evidence of Fale of coal below cost by one
whose tonnage volume was three times that of his largest competitor wvas held sufficient to
allow the jury to infer an intent to destroy the business of his competitors, and later to raae
the price and monopolize the market. Mulliken v. Naph-Sol Refining Co., 302 Mich. 410,
412, 4 NAV.2d 707, 708 (1942) held unenforceable, as against the price-fixing prohibition of
the state anti-trust law, a contract by which a supplier and a retailer of gasoline planned
price reductions to "reestablish the price on a fair basis and drive the so-called cut-rate
stations . . . out of business."
Treble damages have been recovered only in Tooke & Reynolds v. Bastrop Ice &
Storage Co., 172 La. 781, 135 So. 239 (1931), in which plaintiff was injured by the sale of ice
at less than cost by defendant, a large scale operator found to be attempting to create a
monopoly. But the anti-trust point of view appears to have influenced the estension of
principles of unfair competition to prohibit price cutting in Memphis Steam Laundry-
Cleaners v. Lindsay, 192 Miss. 224, 5 So.2d 227 (1941) although the anti-trust statute was
not said to be involved. Defendant extended a large cleaning and pressing businec3 into
plaintiff's area and threatened him with the necessity of doubling his established prices or
facing ruin. When plaintiff refused to raise his rates, his new competitor cut prices to one
half the plaintiff's level, which w.as below defendant's "cost of doing work." Punitive
damages were awarded.
Federal actions: In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), sales of
paper at low prices, sometimes below cost, were made by a combination of manufacturers
allegedly attempting to force plaintiff out of the market. Although plaintiff's capital was not
large and he succumbed, he showed he was an efficient producer who could under normal
conditions have survived. The court upheld his right to recover treble damages in spite of
the difficulty of their measurement, and declared the relation between defendant's fales
below cost and plaintiff's inability to remain in business was properly one for the jury. This
case was followed in Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972 (C.C.A.2d 1944),
in which defendant manufacturers of milk bottle hoods and caps conspired to charge a com-
bination price for both which, though not alleged to be below cost, was fixed so low as to
drive plaintiff, a producer of hoods alone, out of business. The court held that the failure to
allege sales below cost was not a sufficient distinction from the Story Parchment case, since
the prices here fixed "had no reasonable economic foundation" apart from the purpose to
eliminate plaintiff, and that a cause of action for treble damages had been stated. Cf. Fleet-
way v. Public Service Interstate Transportation Co., 72 F.2d 761 (C.C.A. 3d 1934): plain-
tiff, operator of 9 buses, made reductions in fares below those charged by the established
defendant company, operator of 400 buses. Defendant thereupon reduced fares further
(though not to a point alleged to be below his cost) and plaintiff sought injunctive relief just
before being forced out of business. The court, making no distinction between the two price
reductions, denied the injunction since plaintiff "instigated [the] contest"; United States v.
Great Western Sugar Co., 39 F.2d 149 (D. Neb. 1929) (demurrer sustained to a complaint
which alleged defendant cut prices in an area where a competitor planned to build new fac-
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and actions by the Federal Trade Commission 25 have shown that'anti-trust
statutes, if vigorously enough enforced, are fully capable of meeting this
danger. The anti-trust approach, moreover, views the alleged predatory
tories, but which failed to allege this conduct was intended to exclude the new competitor,
or was part of a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act). And see Stone, J., dissenting in
Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768, 771 (C.C.A. 8th 1934).
Earlier anti-trust cases in which sales below cost constituted an element of illegality did
not stress market control as strongly as mere injury to competitors, following the Oil and
Tobacco cases in which underselling and price discrimination were condemned as predatory
practices. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). In Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917), the use of
"fighting" ships to undercut shipping rates of competing lines, with resultant injury to them,
was one element of an illegal combination. Sales below cost were also evidence of an intent
to monopolize in United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y.
1916). And in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); and United
States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927), one of the factors supporting
the findings that these "good" trusts had not violated the Sherman Act was that they had
not sold below cost (Harvester) or made discriminatory price reductions (Steel). For the
more recent emphasis on market effects, see generally Mason, Monopoly in Law and Eco-
nomics, 47 YALE L. J. 34 (1937); Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of
Progress, 14 U. oF CmI. L. REv. 567 (1947).
28. The Commission has taken action against sales below cost, and lists such sales,
when made "with the intent and effect of hindering or suppressing competition," as one of
the "Typical Methods and Practices" which it condemns. See Method 24, FTC ANN,. REP.
42 (1946). These actions are taken despite a limitation contained in Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307 (C.C.A. 7th 1919) which confined the scope of the Commission's
authority to sales accompanied by misrepresentation (such as Sears' false claim that quan-
tity purchases made possible its low price on sugar). The court found that in making "unfair
methods of competition" unlawful in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT.
719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1940) "Congress [did not intend] . . . to restrain an owner of
property from selling it at any price . . . acceptable to him . . ." (at 312). But the same
court later asserted the Commission's ability to restrain price cutting when "used as an
element in some fraudulent scheme of oppression." Sinclair Refining Co. v. FTC, 276 Fed.
686, 688 (C.C.A. 7th 1921), aff'd, 261 U.S. 463 (1923). And Handler, Unfair Competition
and the FTC, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399, 422 (1940), expresses "little doubt of the Com-
mission's authority to prohibit such (below-cost) sales as a part of a scheme to suppress
competition."
Early actions involving sales below cost were inconclusive. Dismissed for lack of proof
or without assignment of reason: United Drug Co., 1 F.T.C. 539 (1919); United States Food
Products Corp., 3 F.T.C. 435 (1920); International Ice Cream Co., 9 F.T.C. 466 (1925);
General Shale Products Corp., 14 F.T.C. 499 (1930). Cease and desist orders issued. Ward
Baking Co., 1 F.T.C. 388 (1919), rev'd because no interstate commerce involed, 264 Fed, 330
(C.C.A.2d 1920); The Oakes Co., 3 F.T.C. 36 (1920) (espionage against competitors as well
as sales below cost); Waldes & Co., 8 F.T.C. 305 (1925) (some false representation as well
as sales below cost); Stipulation 392, 13 F.T.C. 344 (1929) (price discrimination and sales
below cost forbidden).
But beginning with Noma Electric Corp., 15 F.T.C. 87 (1931) the Commission, though
only in a limited number of actions, has restrained below-cost sales when used as an instru.
ment of gaining market domination. See also note 65 infra. In the Noma case respondent,
holding a "dominant position" in the Christmas tree lighting field, sold below cost to drive
out competitors, and was held in violation of the Act. And see Blackwell Journal Publishing
Co., 23 F.T.C. 413 (1936): A newly established newspaper, formpd to oppose the existing
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sales in their full setting,29 and avoids the blanket condemnation provided
in cost protection schemes against any sales below cost, whether made by a
potential monopolist or by a normal competitor. 0 The blanket prohibitions,
paper's editorial position with regard to public ownership of a utility, cut advertising rates
to one-third of the prior level, and sustained losses of $94,000 (original capital $100,000).
As a result, the older paper was forced to take losses of $12,000 a year. Lock Joint Pipe Co.,
27 F.T.C. 709 (1938): Producers, controlling 75 of concrete pipe manufacturing in the
Washington, D.C. area, formed a separate corporation to sell below cost and drive out com-
petition. Collusive bidding through this corporation was a further element of illegality.
E. B. Muller & Co., 33 F.T.C. 24 (1941): Chicory marketers under unified control tried to
eliminate their only substantial competitor by price discriminations which resulted in their
selling substantially below cost, according to the Commission's analysis. Disparagement of
the competitor was also involved. In sustaining the FTC's order on appeal, E. B. Muller &
Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d S11 (C.C.A. 6th 1944), the court held the findings of the FTC's ac-
countant as to losses sustained were not "clearly erroneous" and would therefore prevail
oyer the company's objection that they rested on an arbitrary and unjustified distribution
of cost made by the Commission's accountant. See note 15 supra.
As to the Commission's role in preserving competitive markets generally, see Montague,
The Commission's Jurisdiction orer Practices in Restraint of Trade: A Large-Scale Method of
Mass Enforcement of te Anti-Trust Laws, 8 GEo. WAsa. L. RPv. 365 (1940), and IVATrmns,
PUBLIC REGULATION OF ComiETrn' PRAcncEs iN BusNEnss ENr=RnRrsr, 52, 277 (3d ed.,
1940).
29. See MILLER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 407-8. The necessity of viewing price prac-
tices in their context is well illustrated in Cleaning & Dyeing Plant Owners Ass'n v. Sterling,
285 Ill. App. 336, 2 N.E. 2d 149 (1936). The depression-born plaintiff association, compris-
ing 97 of 105 plant owners in the Chicago area, controlled all prices except those of defendant
non-members, who had failed to comply with plaintiff's demands that all cleaning prices be
uniformly increased. After attempting persuasion by bombs, bullets, and a strike of de-
fendants' employees (secretly organized by plaintiff association), the plaintiff obtained a
lower court injunction against defendants' selling below "costs" specified in an order drawn
up by a master. Plaintiff's bill alleged defendants were "a combination of cut-throat com-
petitors ...demoralizing the industry by selling below cost." Id. at 358, 2 N.E. 2d at
158. The decree was apparently based on violation of the anti-trust law and unfair competi-
tion. Reversed on appeal, since defendants had not sought a monopoly or the destruction of
plaintiff's business, and their sales even if found below cost were not unlawful in themselves;
"but, on the contrary, . . . plaintiffs .. . endeavored to create a monopoly. " Id. at
360, 2 N.E. 2d at 159.
30. Because "at bottom genuine price competition runs rather counter to the businezs
code," Nourse, Cost Finding and Price Determination, N.A.C.A. YnkR Boon 27, 37 (1945)
there is danger that business men will magnify individual injuries from price cutting and de-
mand legal relief where no threat to competitive prices exists, ignoring the fact recognized in
Remington-Rand v. Master-Craft Corp., 67 F.2d 218, 220 (C.C.A. 6th 1933), that "ordinary
rivalry in business" may involve such injuries. The anti-trust doctrines, which do not admit
such "competitive evils" as a justification for price fixing or restraint of trade (United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941); ef. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ) ceem an ade-
quate safeguard against anti-trust statutes being used to inhibit sales below cost indiscrimi-
nately.
By no means do all below-cost sellers seek to dominate the market and extort a monop-
oly profit at some later time. For example, when a new competitor enters the market his
early sales, even though at prices similar to those of his competitors, may involve a lss until
greater volume brings down his unit costs. The extent to which these lozes may be capi-
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in fact, when they depend for their enforcement on private action, are
peculiarly vulnerable to control by the larger units whose interest in price
stability is the greatest, thus assisting the very competitors against whom
sales-below-cost prohibitions are often said to be directed. 31
EARLY EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE
But although economic theory may cast doubts on the desirability of cost
protection, no such doubts have troubled its proponents. The earliest efforts
at its establishment were voluntary regulations, coupled with uniform ac-
counting plans and cbst exchange services, imposed by trade associations
during the 1920's. 3 2 Although such cost protection programs were held by
the Supreme Court to violate the Sherman Act in the Hardwood 13 and Lin-
seed Oil 34 cases, later decisions in the Maple Flooring 11 and Cement 36 cases
greatly widened the scope of permitted activity.37 Further cooperation was
secured in the Trade Practice Conference Procedure which was initiated by
the Federal Trade Commission in 1926 for the ostensible purpose of estab-
lishing industry-wide standards of fair' competition. s Conferences con-
talized as deferred charges is always open to dispute; the seller in this position who attempts
to undercut competing prices to gain business is particularly vulnerable to attack for selling
below cost. The facts may, however, show an attempt to control the market even in thlis
situation, as in Blackwell Journal Publishing Co., 23 F.T.C. 413 (1936). And see NELsoN
AND KIEm, op. cit. supra note 22, at 93. The more usual price cutting case not involving anti-
trust violation will, of course, be presented by the seller who breaks through the non-com-
petitive administered price in an attempt to gain volume. See page 397 supra.
It must be recognized that anti-trust cases examining sales below cost have developed
no definite concepts for calculating cost, and since no administrative hearing precedes anti-
trust litigation, there is no weight to be given to the prosecution's cost calculation such as
the FTC enjoyed in E. B. Muller & Co., 33 F.T.C. 24 (1941). But the cases show that viola-
tions can arise even where price cutting is not below whatever the "costs" may have been,
which suggests that determination of costs may not be vital to prosecutions seeking to pre-
vent market domination. Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972 (C.C.A. 2d
1944); Fleetway v. Public Service Interstate Transportation Co., 72 F.2d 761 (C.C.A. 3d
1934).
31. E.g., CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 438, asserts the state laws are "manifestly
designed to . . . [prevent] the strong from destroying the weak by . .. price war."
32. MILLER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 284-9.
33. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
34. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
35. Maple Flooring Mfrs' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
36. Cement Mfrs' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
37. The field of permitted activity was narrowed in Sugar Institute v. United States,
297 U.S. 553 (1936). In the Maple Flooring case, the trade association promulgated aver-
age "cost" figures to its members, as well as uniform shipment charges, which the court
recognized "could be made the basis for fixing prices .. . [in violation of] the Sherman
Act." Id. at 572. But the Government's contention that such illegal price fixing would be a
necessary result of circulating these cost compilations was rejected, partly because it was
supposed that costs were the proper basis for prices under "economic laws." Id. at 584. See
Fly, Observations on the Anti-Trust Laws, Economic Theory, and the Sugar Institute Decisions,
45 YALE L.J. 1339, 1354, and 46 YALE L. J. 228 (1936).
38. The FTC Conference Division was established, and the Rules were first given
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ducted with industry and trade association representatives resulted in
agreements published by the Commission as Trade Practice Rules; in 140-
odd sets of Rules released before 1932,1 there was expressed what a sym-
pathetic member of the Commission has described as "the humanitarian
impulse" of business groups seeking "protection against . . . unsystema-
tized competition." 4 A more realistic observer saw the "unremitting
pressure of the trade associations" employing the conferences as "a device
for controlling prices." 41 Virtually unrestrained by the Commission,
42
participants advanced their programs both by recommending uniform ac-
counting procedures and by condemning, as unfair competition, all sales
below cost.
43
One of the clearest examples of the efficacy of trade association techniques
was the system utilized by the association of commercial printing concerns.
A uniform "Cost System" prescribed standard procedures by which 5100-
odd competitors were directed to calculate their costs in quoting prices and
making reports to the association; a Standard Guide and Price List pro-
vided averaged data, based on cost reports of selected members, and sug-
gested a 25% mark-up over costs in quoting prices. In an investigation of
the association, 44 the FTC found widespread approval by the membership
of the effect of this scheme on printing prices. As one local bulletin ex-
plained:
"The old cutthroat days have gone, . . . and in their stead are
days of the standardization of prices based on accurate costs as
found by cost systems. . . . Too frequently . . . printers . . .
have resorted to 'guess-timating,' . . . driving the buyer...
to shop . . . to get the lowest price. . . . [Now, competing]
Commission sanction, in 1926, though some conferences were held earlier. FTC ANN. REP.
47-50 (1926).
39. FTC ANN. REP. 253 (1932).
40. GASKILL, THE REGULATION OF ComPETITIoN 130-1 (1936).
41. Watkins, Trade Associations, 14 ENCYc. Soc. Sci. 670, 675 (1934). And -ee Kittelle
and Mostow, A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of the FTC, 8 GEO. WAsh. L. REV.
427, 437-8 (1940); Bums, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4
LAW & Co.TEmP. PROB. 301,304 (1937).
42. Roos, NRA Ecoxomnc PLANNING 14-16 (1937). It was only after the Department
of Justice in 1931 threatened to take action because the Conferences were "transforming the
Sherman law out of all recognition" (GAsEILL, op. cit. supra note 40, at 120), that the Com-
mission began to exercise some control over the Rules. See 1 LYON, W\A~mws AN AnRi U-
soN, GOVERNMENT AND Ecoxomc LIFE 288 (Brookings Inst. 1939).
43. W ATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BusLumss E%-mn-
PPisE, c. VII (3d ed. 1940); FTC, TRADE PRACTICE CoNFERE Ecs (1933); TANNENBAUM,
oP. cit. supra note 13, at 11. Rules first promulgated for the Waxed Paper Industry, which
forbade below-cost sales without qualification, and called for the adoption of cost systems,
are given in Nelson, Trade Practice Conference Rules and the Consumer, 8 GEo. \VAsa. L.
REv. 452, 455 (1940). And see Beer, Competition and the Federal Constitution, 7 Noins
DAME LAW. 442,462-5 (1932).
44. United Typothetae of America, 6 F.T.C. 345 (1923).
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printers . . . quote about the same price .... This . . .relieves
the printer ... and it saves the buyer . . . time ... " ,
The cease and desist order issued in this case 4G reflected the more lenient
views to be expressed by the Supreme Court in the Maple Flooring case; 47
though the Commission forbade publication of the Price List, it took no
action to enforce its equally important order against the use of averaged
cost data as a basis for fixed prices, actually countenancing, in fact, that
order's violation. 8 The association's plans for peace among the printers
were thus left relatively intact, available to point the way to others.49
45. Id. at 366, quoting from the Portland Typothetae, July 15, 1919. The Printer's
Guide declared, "A manufacturer need have no fear of a competitor if both ascertain their
cost in a uniform way." Id. at 375. Further indications of the nature and purpose of this
system fill the record, which was based on extensive hearings across the country over a six-
month period. E.g., "When strong cooperation is backed up with cost-finding, [printers]
have plenty of guts to charge prices, because they can get them." Ibid. ". . . prices are
running more uniform, with larger profits .. . [E]very printer .. . [hopes for] . . . a
non-competitive basis ... " Id. at 374; "The average increase in prices .. . is easily
20%." Id.at373.
46. The order forbade (1) the use of a cost system so as to suggest uniform additions
to cost, (2) the receipt and publication of average or standard production costs for use in
quoting prices. Id. at 383.
47. See note 35 supra.
48. As explained to the Second Annual Conference on Uniform Cost Accounting spon-
sored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in 1924, the United Typothetae had already
abandoned the 25% mark-up and had come to rely primarily on dissemination of averaged
production data for every printing process, to which plants in various areas added the local
hourly labor costs in quoting prices. Address of E. T. Miller, Secretary of the Typothetac,
in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 34-8 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1924). "Why .. . go to
all this trouble to find costs unless we can use them? . .. We collect records . . .and give
our members something on which they can calculate prices. . . ." Id. at 38. This use of
compilations from uniform cost data, presenting to producers the statistics on which they
can base prices regardless of their own individual costs, is the "focal point" of cost account-
ing activities currently forwarded by one-half of the country's trade associations; uniform
cost systems are "merely a beginning." PEARCE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 297, 258. In the
printers' case, the FTC's clear prohibition against publishing this averaged data was
alarming, "as that work was of vital importance [and] .. . to retire from the battle . . .
would be giving up fifteen years of pioneer . ..work." Statement of Counsel for the
Typothetae, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 40. Accordingly, a petition to review the
Commission's order was filed. United Typothetae v. FTC, 2 CCH TRADE REG. SuRv.
6380.63 (C.C.A. 7th 1923). But correspondence with the Commission and ". . . the most
earnest and sympathetic cooperation .. . from Commissioner Gaskill [who appeared]
exceedingly patient, broad-gauged . . . " revealed that only publication of the price list
was prohibited and that in respect to the averaged production costs the order did not at all
mean what it plainly said, although "the commission could not see its way to publish .. .
[this] . .. final outcome . . ." CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 41. (As to the views
of Commissioner Gaskill, see notes 13, 40 supra).
49. The Typothetae's system, which at one time engaged more than thirty field ac-
countants, was a model to others although, "[l]ike every work that is successful, there [was]
criticism" such as the FTC leveled. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 48, at 34. All
Typothetae members were kept rigidly "in line on uniformity" of accounts and reports. Id.
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Trade Practice Conference Rules and the programs of trade associations19
followed by the Swope Plan, proposing a gigantic national trade group which
would have made cost systems universal,51 were all harbingers of the NRA
codes, which gave to the cost protection theory its most vigorous expres-
sion. Intensified by depression, the drive to restrict price competition was
given unlimited scope in the early NRA. In fixed minimum prices, 2 in
"cost finding systems" originally contained in three-quarters of the codes
as a "cornerstone of the hopes of a large number of applicants," 3 and in
sales-below-cost prohibitions, 4 the Blue Eagle scowled on all varieties of
price reductions.5 5 But its unqualified support of these techniques was
at 59. And see Jacke, Printing Cost Estimates for Price Selling, 15 N.A.C.A. BULL. 325
(1933). There is now pending against the Typothetae an FTC action to restrain uniform
price fidng, etc. Docket4517,2 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 6380.63 (1942).
50. The U. S. Chamber of Commerce energetically promoted uniform accounting in all
trades by means of conferences and publications. See pamphlets by U. S. Cimvrnr. or-
COMIuERCE: WHAT A COST SYs=M SHOULD Do FOR You (1924); Umronms CosT AccouWE-
ING IN TRADE AssocTuIoNs: Tam CosT COMITTEE (1924), ORGANIZATiOn op AcTvrws
(1924), ACCEPTANCE AND INSTALLArION (1925). Arguments advanced for cost systems in-
cluded assertions that inefficiencies were exposed and prices reduced; guarded references to
an opposite effect on price policies of "price cutters" were also made. At the Second Annual
Chicago Conference on Uniform Cost Accounting, the delegate from the IMill: Dealer'
Association typically remarked with regard to installation of their cost System: "The splen-
did cooperation we have experienced from our member[s] . . . has been truly remarha-
ble ... ." CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 11 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1924). The wbrk
of the Chamber was described in Halligan, supra note 13, at 74, as "one of the greatest forces
that has brought the benefits of uniform cost accounting to . . . various industries." The
Chamber's recent advocacy of these benefits has been more carefully stated. See BL'LsDELL,
Ecoromc POWER & POLITICAL PREssUREs 31 (TNEC Monograph 26,1941).
51. Address by Gerard Swope, 65 Automotive Industries 476-9 (1931). Employers of
50 or more were to adopt "standard accounting and cost systems" based on a "uniform
plan . . . adopted by the industry trade association." Business Week approved the plan,
noting that ". . . [in] these times ... the consumers' interest in low prices is an obvious
illusion ... ." Editorial, Business Week, Sept. 30, 1931, p. 44. See also Senator Nye's
proposals to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act and to outlaw sales below cost.
MILLER, UNFAIR COmPETITION, 296-8 (1941).
52. Minimum prices were set specifically in the early codes. Taggart, Minimum Prices
Under the N.R.A., 7 U. OF MIcH. Bus. STUDIES No. 3 (1936). And see OFRENurn, CasEs o..:
TADE REGULATION 1232-4 (1936).
53. LYON, et al., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY AwnwisRATron 224 (Brookings Inst.,
1935).
54. Such prohibitions were contained in a majority of the codes. Id. at 580-6. And
see PrARcE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 296.
55. LYON, op. cit. supra note 53, at 620-2. The "model code," prepared in NRA's early
days by the National Industrial Conference Board forbade selling below cost and defined
cost as the average of costs reporlcd to the several trade associations. NICB Memo, Formula-
tion of Codes of Fair Competition, June, 1933, quoted in MAeC, CoN.'oULNo RETA , s
148-9 (1936).
In the 1933 NRA price hearings, it was stated: "The NRA has been a God-send and,
to my mind, the finest thing . . . ever created for the benefit of industry. Who are . . .
these poor... consumers we hear so much about.. .after all, but the servants and em-
ployees of industry?" Statement of Frank A. Bond, member of Chain Mfg. Industry Code
Authority, quoted in HAmULTON AND TILL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 34.
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short-lived, for the Recovery Administration soon realized it had the price-
fixing bear by the tail.56 Both in defining the uniform accounting systems it
would approve, 7 and in qualifying its endorsement of sales-below-cost
prohibitions," the NRA executed a significant and almost complete reversal
56. LYON, op. cit. supra note 53, at 224. The Consumers' Advisory Board of NRA had
opposed price fixing in various forms from the beginning, with some few exceptions. OPrln-
HElM, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1236. And see Roos, op. cit. supra note 42, at 257-9,559-60.
57. Of the more than 400 industries whose codes prohibited sales below cost, half pre-
sented for NRA approval their systems of uniform cost accounting, which contained in
almost all cases arbitrary provisions tending toward higher cost bases for prices. PEARCE,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 296. Most of the proposed systems were therefore rejected: il
addition to the 23 cost systems already in use at the time NRA began, only 39 others were
accepted for code purposes, but many of these provided for all elements of direct and in-
direct costs. LYON, op. cit. supra note 53, at 586-9.
As NRA policy clarified on the use of such systems for price fixing, it made several
changes:
(a) it announced (in July, 1934) that it would approve only systems which carried in-
ventory values at "cost or market, whichever is lower," to prevent what the Administration
called "artificial mandatory profits to those who accumulated inventories at low prices."
Cost Accounting and the NRA, Am. Institute of Accountants Bull., Aug. 15, 1934. This pro-
nouncement struck down the cost protection attempt to force sellers to base their prices on
what were called "standard costs" i.e., prevailing market costs, and to ignore any advanta-
geous purchases which would allow them to sell for less. Passing on any advantage in lower
prices had been described by this view as "not . . . correct from the standpoint of cost
calculation . . ."; it would "glut the market" and destroy all competing sellers. Churchill,
Materials in Standard Costs, 8 N.A.C.A. BULL. 984, 986 (1927).
(b) it disapproved the inclusion of interest and a return on invested capital as part of
the inflexible "costs" of an enterprise. Cost Accounting and the NRA, supra.
(c) NRA disallowed depreciation of already depreciated assets, depreciation at replace-
ment rather than cost values, or depreciation charges based on a current low volume of sales
if "normal" volume was higher. Boyd, Uniform Cost Accounting Systems Under the NRA,
14 CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 671 (1934), and Boyd, NRA and Destructive Price
Cutting, 15 CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 69 (1935).
58. The costs below which sales were prohibited frequently were average costs, Back-
man, supra note 20, at 146, and these were often gathered, in the absence of adequate or
comparable cost data, from scanty and unreliable sources. Taggart, supra note 52, at 230.
The NRA made belated attempts to overthrow these averages, and to substitute the in-
dividual's own costs as the standard, Boyd, Uniform Cost Accounting Systems Under the
NRA, supra note 57. NRA Office Memorandum No. 228, June 7,1934, though it encouraged
"proper cost finding and accounting provisions in codes," sought to allow the individual to
compute his own costs and to impose a uniform system upon him only "to the extent found
practicable," thus avoiding "uniform items of cost . . . designed to bring about...
uniformity . . . of prices." Cf. the strict uniformity imposed on printers by the Typothetac,
supra note 49. Memorandum No. 228 further indicated a retreat from outright prohibitions
on below-cost selling by providing only that "consideration should be given to costs in tile
determination of [prices] . . ." (italics added); what was forbidden was "destructive price
cutting," as to which individual rulings would be made in response to complaints. In 1935,
Nat. Industrial Recovery Board Release on Administrative Policy No. 3, NS. May 21,
1935, quoted in OPPENHIM, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1234 laid a groundwork for abandoning
the entire scheme of below-cost prohibitions. Pointing out that "business enterprise does not
assure cost recovery" but "gives an opportunity to . . . profit and [a] . . . threat of loss,"
it asserted that "price is sometimes above and sometimes below the cost of production."
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of its original policy.- Although the full development of this change was
cut short by the Schechter 0 decision, it seems clear that the evils of cost
protection were apparent even to an agency whose devotion to the philoso-
phy of the Sherman Act was somewhat questionable.'1
With the collapse of the NRA, trade groups which turned again to the
Trade Practice Conferences 62 found that they, too, were informed by a
different spirit. No uniform accounting procedures were encouraged, 3 and a
radical change was made in the type of sales-below-cost prohibition which
the Trade Commission would approve. The rule approved in 1939 for the
wine industry,14 for example, applied only to sales made by a dominant
member of the industry in order to restrain trade or monopolize, and re-
ferred only to the seller's own costs, and not to any average or cost-survey
figure. 5 Indeed, all recent activities of the Trade Commission show an
awareness of the effectiveness and danger of the generalized sales-below-cost
prohibition as a price-fixing instrument
0
Several retail trade groups, however, which had enjoyed in the NRA
It attributed to the depression emergency the "prominence (of] ... a cost recovery theory
of price."
59. The setting of outright minimum prices, see note 52 mipra, was curtailed by NRA
Office Memorandum No. 228, supra note 58, which permitted establishing such minima
only temporarily fora declared "emergency."
60. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
61. Professor Himmelblau, a member of the Committee on Accounting Procedure of
The American Institute of Accountants, has stated: "One of the fundamental ideas in the
whole NRA program was that all prices should be set in terms of cost. The NRA . . . was
worth much of what it cost if it accomplished nothing more than to reveal the fallacy of this
theory." Advanced Cost Accounting Materials, Northwestern University, 1936.
62. Kittelle and Mostow, supra note 41, at 433.
63. Among the rules collected in FTC, TRADE PRACTIc E RULnS (1940), none provides
a uniform accounting system for an industry; those which refer to accounting state only that
"each member should independently keep proper ... records for determining his costs."
Id. at 24. The Commission was led to this more cautious policy byarealization that former
rules, requiring cost calculations to include "all elements recognized by good accounting
practice," (id. at 2) might be used "as a club to intimidate concerns which reduced prices
legitimately." Nelson, supra note 43, at 455. And see MILLER, Op. Cit. Mif.a note 51, at
275; FTC, TRADE PRACTICE RuLEs (1946).
64. FTC, TRADE PRACTI cE RULES 232 (1940).
65. "Sales below cost by a competitor not in a sufficiently strong competitive position
to produce, and not actually producing, the monopolistic or restraining effect mentioned,
do not fall within the inhibitions of this rule." Ibid. This type of prohibition thus substi-
tutes the test of adverse effect on the market, rather than mere adverse effect on Eome in-
dividual competitors, as the standard for defining sales below cost as predatory. See also
similar provisions in Rules for the Wholesale Confectionery Industry, Rule 17 (bul cf. rule
10), 3 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 20,252; Vertical Turbine Pump Industry, Rule 12, id. at
20,255; Doll and Stuffed Toy Industry, Rule 6, id. at 20,256. And see Nelson, supra
note 43, at 454-56.
66. See FTC, REPORT ON RES.LE PRIcE MAINTENA CE (1945); Wholesale Liquor
Distributors' Ass'n of No. Calif., 31 F.T.C. 1453 (1940); Western Confectioners Ass'n, 34
F.T.C. 1431 (1942), discussed at pp. 418-9 infra.
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Retail Code 67 "just enough of a taste of long-forbidden fruits to whet their
appetites," 68 were not disposed to surrender the sanctions which the Code
had provided against price reductions, whether made by large enterprises
or small 9 Combined in the Food and Grocery Conference,70 trade associa-
tions in the grocery field secured the adoption during the late thirties of
many of the state Unfair Practices Acts forbidding sales below cost.
71 The
other statutes, similarly framed in the traditional lingo of measures seeking
to preserve free competition, 72 were enacted during the same period. In con-
67. NRA Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Trade, approved Oct. 21, 1933, re-
printed in MACK, op. cit. supra note 55, at 521. As originally drafted, this Code rewarded
the "hopes and desires of a century held by fair-minded merchants, trade associations, and
Chambers of Commerce," by requiring a uniform ten-percent markup over invoice cost for
all sales. NRA Press Release No. 858, Sept. 21, 1933, quoting statement of Nat, Ass'n of
Better Business Bureaus. As recounted generally in MACE, op. cit. supra note 55, this pro-
vision was held out of the Code by the efforts of Macy's and the Consumer's Advisory
Board, but the requirement (in art. VII, sec. 1) that prices allow for "actual wages of store
labor" amounted to the same thing, for the code authority fixed this allowance at ten-
percent for the entire retail trade. This code did not include food products, the percentage
markup for which was set in the Food and Grocery Code at six percent. ZORN AND FmLD.
mAN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 318-9.
68. GRaEmER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10.
69. The end of NRA saw many trade associations and their rules of conduct collapse,
in very many cases because the association could not continue to stabilize prices through its
own efforts. PEARCE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 372. Spokesmen, who complained more often
against price cutting by small enterprises than by larger ones, typically stated: ". . . the
chiseling 10 percent who operate in every business will not abide by any rules unless en-
forced by State or National laws." Id. at 18.
70. The Food and Grocery Conference Commission represented: Nat'l Retail Grocers'
Assoc.; Assoc. Grocery Mfrs. of America; Nat'l Chain Store Assoc.; Nat'l American Whole-
sale Assoc.; Nat'l Retail Owned Wholesale Grocers; Nat'l Voluntary Groups Institute.
Comment, 32 ILL. L. REv. 816,846 n.184 (1938).
71. The model bill prepared by the Conference Commission was of the minimum
mark-up type, Ibid., and see note 90 infra; and the percentage mark-ups were those more
suited to the retail food trade than to others. ZORN AND FELDMAN, op. cit. supra note 12,
at 323-4; Tannenbaum, supra note 13, at 42. The food trades supported these Acts because
resale price maintenance is for various reasons inapplicable in food retailing, where it has
been attempted only in Ohio. See note 3 supra; FTC, REPORT ON RESALE, PRICe MAIN-
T"ENANCE 274-333 (1945); GRETHER, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 13. Gasoline, cigarette, and
confectionery distributors have also made use of or sponsored the legislation. Thus in Ohio,
after the manner in which resale price maintenance was used to stabilize cigarette prices
had been held unlawful in Rayes v. Lane Drug Co., 138 Ohio St. 401,35 N.E. 2d44 7(1941),
the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act was enacted, fixing the mark-ups for wholesalers and retailers.
OHIO GEN. CODE § 6402-10 (Page, Supp. 1945).
It is to be noted that the retail food trade which the statutes largely affect is relatively
unorganized, less than one-eighth of the natioa's grocers being members of the Nat'l Assoc.
of Retail Grocers. (FTC REPORY, supra, at 257-8.) Whether the statutes, which have been
declared to have the purpose of "shielding the little fellow from his giant rival" (1 CALLMIAN,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 424) were secured through the efforts of the "little fellow" or by his
"giant rival" is therefore a very real question.
72. Thus the California Act states its purpose "to safeguard the public against the
creation . . . of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition. . . ." CAL. Bus, &
PROF. CODE § 17001 (1944).
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trast to earlier state legislation of the 1900's, as a part of which eight states 73
had forbidden sales below cost when made with an intent to destroy com-
petition,74 the acts of the post-NRA 1930's were not inspired by a renewed
enthusiasm for anti-trust programs, but were designed to codify the princi-
ple of cost protectionY5
THE STATE STATUTES: PROVISIONS, CONSTRUCTION, AND ENFORCEMENT
The thirty-one statutes 76 forbid, in all but a few cases, the sale of any
type of merchandise at less than the seller's cost, though their principal
application has been in the tobacco products, confectionery, and grocery
fields. In several cases they have met defeat in the courts on constitutional
grounds,7' but in twventy-eight states, either amended or as yet untested,
73. Ark., Idaho, Miss., Neb., N. C., S. C., Tenn., Texas. The South Carolina statute,
S. C. CODE § 6626 (1942) is considered as part of this anti-trust legislation; cf. H,M.LER,
op. cit. szprca note 3, at 1089 n.2 0 .
74. See GRETHER Op. cit. supra note 3, at 36-7. A similar Kentucky statute, which
declared it a crime for a combination to set a price above or below "real value," was held
unconstitutional in Internat'l Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
75. See McAllister, Prive Control by Law in the United States: A Surrey, 4 LAw A.D
Cox=m,. PRoD. 273, 298 (1937): "The cost protection principle of (the Unfair Practices
Acts) is but the provision of the N.R.A. Retail Trade Code in a new dress and it is directly
traceable to it."
76. AIZ. CODE ANN. § 74-301 (1939); ARE. STAT. § 14313 (Pope, 1937); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17043 (Deering, 1944); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, § 302(1) (Supp. 1946); Comr;.
GEN. STAT., c. 138b, § 922 (Supp. 1939); IDAHO CODE A.NN. §47-201 (Supp. 1940); KA;.
GEN. STAT. § 50-401 (Corrick, Supp. 1945); Ky. Rnv. STAT. §§ 365.030-070, 365.990
(1946); LA. GEN. STAT., c. 2A, § 4931.1 (Dart, Supp. 1947); ME. REv. STAT., c. 170, § 2
(1944); ID. ANN. CODE, Art. 83, §§ 111-115 (Flack, Supp. 1943); MAss. AN,. LAws, c. 93,
§ 14E-K (1946); lica. STAT. ANN., c. 278, § 28.31 (Supp. 1946) (bakery and petroleum
products); M=x . STAT., c. 21A, § 3976-41 (Mason, Supp. 1946); Mo!-r. REv. CODE, c.
112A, § 7590.3 (Supp. 1939); NEB. REv. STAT. § 59-1201 (1943); N. H. Rnv. LAws, c. 204
(1942); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:4-S (1939); N.D. Rnv. CODE § 51-10 (1943); Ono GEN. CODE:
§ 6402-10 (Page, Supp. 1945) (cigarettes); OLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 591-97 (Supp. 1947);
Oa. Comp. LAws § 43-104 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 73, § 211 (Purdon, Supp. 1946);
R.I. Laws 1939, c. 671, and Laws 1941, c. 1039; TENN. CODE ANw., c. 38B, § 6770.7 (W1il-
liams, 1941); UTAH CODE ANN., tit 16A, c. 4 (1943); VA. CODE, c. 61A, § 1463(1) (1942);
WVAsH. R v. STAT. § 5854-21 (Remington, Supp. 1940); IV. CODE AN;'., Art. 1A,
§ 4678(8a) (1943); Wisc. STAT. § 100.30 (1945); Wyo. Conw. STAT. § 39-407 (1945).
77. Arizona: The 1939 Act =as held unconstitutional in State v. Meyerson, 2 P-H
TRADE AIM IND. SERV. (2d ed.) 97,151 (Prima County Sup. Ct. 1941), because criminal
intent was not required for violation, and because of indefiniteness of terms defining invoice
cost. But the state supreme court, in State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 303, 113 P.2d
650 (1941), upheld the main provisions of the act, invalidating only the provisions (to which
the lower court had objected) that disallowed cost calculations based on purchases which
could not be "justified by prevailing market conditions in this state." (But note that identi-
cal requirements that invoice cost be based on local market conditions exist in the statutes of
Conn., Idaho, Mass., Neb., R. 1. and Tenn.)
California: Balzer v. Caler, 74 P.2d 839 (Cal.App. 1937) held the 1935 Act unconstitu-
tional because of uncertainty in the prohibited conduct, and lack of uniformity in its effect
on large and small sellers. This holding was reversed on appeal in 11 Cal.2d 663, 82 P.2d 19
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they have survived. s While only a few courts have seen in them an attempt
to gain economic advantages not stated in the revealed purposes of the legis-
lation,79 some courts appear to have recognized the economic implications
(1938), in an opinion deciding the companion case of Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of
So. Calif. v. Nat'l Candy and Tobacco Co., 11 Cal.2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938); see note 80 infra.
Maryland: Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy and Tobacco Co., 178 Md.
38, 12 A.2d 201 (1940), invalidated the 1939 Act on account of a cost calculation require-
ment similar to Arizona's, supra, and because the Act allowed a violation to be found where
there was an intent, effect, or result of injuring competitors or destroying competition. The
later Act remedied these defects by striking out the reference to "market conditions" within
the state, and limiting the statute's application to sales made with an intent to injure, etc.
Md. Laws 1941, c. 330; See Engleman v. Blum, CCH TRADE REG. SERV. '44-'47 Dec.
57,590 (Balt. Circ. Ct. 1947).
Michigan: The 1937 Act, dealing only with bakery and petroleum products, was held
unconstitutional as to § 6, forbidding premiums or gifts, in People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506,
283 N.W. 666 (1939). The entire Act was found invalid, because of vagueness in defining
cost and the inclusion of more than one subject in a single Act. In re Frens and Dare,
Ingham County Circuit Court, (Chicago Tribune, Dec. 23, 1939, cited in FTC, REPORT ON
RESALE PICE MAINTENANCE 120 (1945)).
Minnesota: The federal court found the Act of 1937 offensive to the 14th Amendment
because the presumed violation when sales were made below the required 10% mark-up was
not justified, and for many other reasons. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70
(D.C. Minn. 1938). With minor changes, the amended Act (Minn. Laws 1939, c. 403)
passed a state court test in McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N. W. 414 (1940).
Nebraska: The 1937 Act, lacking an intent requirement, was invalidated in State ex, rel.
English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N. W. 607 (1938); Neb. Laws 1941, c. 123, made
intent or effect of injuring competitors or diverting trade a requisite for violation.
New Jersey: The 1938 Act, similarly lacking any requirement of intent, was declared un-
constitutional for that reason. State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 16 N. J. Misc. 479, 2 A,2d
599 (Dist. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Ohio: The Unfair Cigarette Sales Act was invalidated for failure to differentiate between
the costs of service and cash-and-carry wholesalers; the Act was also found to have a tend-
ency to fix uniform prices. Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 74 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio Ct. App.
1947).
Pennsylvania: The 1937 Act, containing no intent requirement, was found invalid in
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940), but Pa. Acts 1941, No. 344 for-
bids sales below cost made with the intent of injuring a competitor or with the result of de-
ceiving any purchaser or prospective purchaser.
For treatment of the issues of constitutionality, see 86 U. of PA. L. REV. 780 (1938),
43 DICK. L. REv. 112 and 127 (1939), 6 U. oF Cur. L. REv. 329 (1939), 52 HARv. L. REV.
1142 (1939), 25 VA. L. REv. 851 (1939), 8 DuKE B.A.J. 42 (1940), 5 NEWAiK L, REv. 172
(1940), 15 TULANE L. REv. 277 (1941), 36 ILL. L. REv. 682 (1942).
78. Of the statutes listed in note 76, supra, only those of Michigan, New Jersey and
Ohio are now without effect, and the Arizona Act is limited only slightly.
79. The New Jersey court declared the Act involved "fixing the price of all goods"to
"help a few selfish interests." State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 16 N. J. Misc. 479, 482,
2 A.2d 599, 600 (1938). See Commonwealth v. Hodin, 34 Pa. D. & C. 270, 278 (1938). In
Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 74 N. E.2d 853, 855-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947), the Ohio court
asserted, "An act which can be defended only on the basis that it . . . fosters competition
is twisted to accomplish the direct opposite, namely, sale . . . at a uniform price." The
Michigan court found its statute "savor[ed] of an attempt to [maintain] the prices and profits
of those already in the business." People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 511, 283 N. W. 666, 669
(1939).
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of the acts and to have approved them. ° Most judicial discussion of con-
stitutional issues has, however, been preoccupied with such questions as the
definiteness with which the conduct made criminal is described, and, par-
ticularly, the presence or absence of an intent to violate the laws.81 Al-
though the statutes, as thus shaped by the courts, do not prohibit sales
beloW cost unless made with an "intent" 82 to injure competitors, or to de-
ceive purchasers, 3 the shadow of intent is barely visible and its substance is
80. "That statute recognizes that there is such a thing as too much competition, and
aims to restrain it .... " Lichterman v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers Union, 204
Minn. 75, 77, 282 N. IV. 689, 690 (1938). The court held the Minnesota Act modified the
restraint of trade concepts contained in the state's anti-trust act. See also: Moore v. North-
ern Ky. Ind. Food Dealers Assoc., 286 Ken. 24, 149 S.V.2d 755 (1941). Fear of possible
conflict with the state anti-trust law is suggested in a provision of the Massachusetts Unfair
Practices Act declaring it shall prevail in case of conflict with other legislation. Mass. Laws
1938, c. 410, § 141. Many courts, however, have gone to great lengths to find their Acts
were not price fixing laws: e.g., Jonke v. Save-a-Nickel Stores, 2 P-H TRADE AND I.,D. SERv.
96,534 (Dist. Ct. Colo. 1937), Carroll v. Schwartz, 127 Conn. 126, 14 A.2d 754 (1940).
Assoc. Merchants v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 530, 86 P.2d 1031 (1939), Rust v. Griggs, 172
Tenn. 565, 113 SAV.2d 733 (1938).
The most perplexing economic reasoning is found in decisions which approve the price-
fixing purposes of Unfair Practices Acts because resale price maintenance, which also in-
volves price fixing (supra, note 3), has been approved. State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84
P.2d 767 (1938); Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of So. Calif. v. Nat'l Candy and
Tobacco Co., 11 Cal.2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938). In the influential Tobacco Dealers case, the
California court considered arguments of amici curiae that the Unfair Practices Act "cannot
possibly prevent ... monopolies and will not foster free. . . competition . . . [but]
will foster monopolies and .. . favor the large chain stores and large distributors as against
the small merchant .... " but it found these contentions "fairly debatable." Id. at 650,
82 P.2d at 12. It recalled having upheld the state resale price maintenance ("fair trade")
law in Max Factor & Co. v. Kusman, 5 Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936), a.fd, 299 U.S. 198
(1936), and it quoted its assertion there that "Economic and judicial thought ... has
glong] been divided on the economic question as to the benefits ...of free and open com-
petition, and its necessary corollary, price-cutting." Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of
So. Cal. v. Nat'l Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 647, 82 P.2d 3, 11 (1938). The basic
purpose of resale price maintenance and of sales below cost prohibitions, it held, was the
same. Therefore, it found "applicable" the "theory" of Supreme Court decisions in the
Max Factor case and in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers, 299 U.S. 183
(1936). Both these cases, however, justified resale price maintenance as a protection of the
property of the brand-name owner, who would be damaged if his product fell into a price-
cutter's hands. This factor, of course, is wholly lacking in the case of statutes dealing ith
sales below cost; the only "similarity" of purpose is that both types of legislation try to
restrain competitive forces and achieve price stability. The analogy to resale price mainte-
nance, therefore, serves to show that the court (although it denied the Act in question was
a price-fixing law) considered the Act to have a price-fixing purpose, but it viewed this pur-
pose as reasonable and desirable.
81. See Note 77 supra.
82. Oregon alone requires no "intent" for a violation of its statute.
83. Various wordings in the statutes suggest a confusion as to what precise deception
is sought to be avoided. The Arizona Act, for example, forbids sales below cost where the
intent or effect is to induce the purchase of other merchandise. Only three statutes refer to
"bait selling,"-the advertising of bargain wares in short supply. The Tennessee Act for-
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gone: where injury or deception is the effect or result of such sales, they are
declared by the statutes to have been intended to injure or deceive,8 4 and in
many states a prima facie case arises (or there is "presumptive evidence" of
intent 11) on the mere making of a sale below cost."8
Once such a sale is shown, therefore, it is difficult for the seller to prove his
inno~ence, and the crucial question under the acts thus comes down to what
amounts to "cost" and how it may be proved. Nine of the statutes,8 7 not
confining themselves to distributive trades, deal also with producers88 and
define their costs as "the costs of raw materials, labor and all overhead ex-
penses." 89 The remainder refer only to costs of wholesalers and retailers,
bids a sale the "intent, effect or result" of which is to "deceive or mislead any purchaser or
prospective purchaser." The idea seems to go back to Brandeis' declaration, supra note 12,
that "a loss-leader is a mis-leader."
84. Even though the injurious effect or result is not shown, a below-cost seller has
usually been held to the knowledge that his sales, or even his advance advertisements of
them, would injure competitors or deceive purchasers. Mering v. Del Paso Market, 2 P-H
TRADE & IND. SERV. 96,603 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1936); Dikeou v. Food Distributors Ass'n, 107
Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940);. Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S.W.2d 733 (1938).
Despite the objection of the Maryland court in the Lord Baltimore case, supra note 77, that
such statutory wording forbade virtually al sales below cost, since the seller could never
tell, as a practical matter, when the distant "effect" or "result" of his sale might injure a
competitor or deceive a customer, this pattern remains a normal one in other jurisdictions.
85. This wording appears in the California law (supra note 76, § 17071).
86. Such statutory presumptions are found in various forms in the statutes of Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Virginia, West Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. They lend great strength to the stat-
utes, forcing the accused seller, in order to avoid a directed verdict, either to dispute what
his "costs" are (see note 105 infra) or attempt an almost hopeless proof of innocent intent.
In thus laying the burden on a price-cutter, these statutes vigorously enact the theory of
"justification," discussed supra note 8. Generally, the legal test of validity of such a statu-
tory presumption is said to be the reasonableness of the relationship between the fact proved
or alleged and the fact presumed. See Notes, 1941 Wis. L. REv. 425, 431; 162 A.L.R. 495,
532 (1946). On this basis, the federal court in Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp.
70, 80 (D.C. Minn. 1938), found the presumption unreasonable because there were "many
reasons, aside from a desire to injure competitors, which might induce a merchant to make
profitless sales of goods." But the Minnesota statute there held unconstitutional was soon
reenacted with a provision making sale at less than 8% above manufacturer's list price
prima facie evidence of violation.
There have been occasional judicial attempts to rescue the intent supposedly necessary
for violation of the Acts. The Wisconsin court in State v. Twentieth Century Market, 236
Wis. 215, 294 N.W. 873 (1940), did not give effect to the presumption of an intent to injure
created by its statute, and in R. R. Commr's v. Sawyers' Stores, 114 Mont. 562, 138 P.2d
964 (1943) (applying a statute which did not contain the presumption), the sale below cost
was said to give rise to no presumption of an intent to injure. And see People v. Pay Less
Drug Store, 143 P.2d 762 (Cal. 1943), aff'd, 25 Cal.2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 (1944); Miller's
Groceteria Co. v. Food Distr. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 113, 109 P.2d 637 (1941); Kentucky Utilities
Co. v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 151, 118 S.W.2d 158 (1938); Op. Att'y Gen., Minnesota,
CCH TRADE REG. SERV. '44-'47 Dec. 57,618.
87. Ark., Cal., Colo., Ky., Mont., Ore., Utah, Wash., and Wyo.
88. There is no litigation showing application of any of these acts to producers.
89. This typical wording appears in § 17026 of the California Act, supra note 76.
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and state the minimum level to be invoice cost plus the "cost of doing busi-
ness" according to one.of two general formulae. Under the one type of act,
costs of doing business, "in the absence of proof of a lower cost," are estab-
lished as six percent (or more) of the retailer's total invoice cost, and two
percent for the wholesaler 0 The other type of statute, following the lead of
California, does not prescribe a fixed percentage to represent "cost of doing
business," but lists as its components an exhaustive array of overhead e-x-
penses such as labor, rent, salaries, depreciation, credit losses, and advertis-
ing.91 Under this definition, the trade association with its averaged cost
estimate is given as much scope as was sought in earlier schemes of cost pro-
tection, for a parallel provision in acts of this type makes "an established
cost survey," conducted by an association in the trade of which the offender
is a member, competent evidence to prove the offender's actual cost of doing
business.92 Whatever percentage the trade association lays down, when
added to invoice cost, 3 appears to determine the "costs" which this type of
legislation will protect, for there are virtually no requirements to be met by a
"cost survey" before it is entitled to play its significant role in cost defini-
tion.1
4
90. Acts of this type exist in Ariz., Conn., Idaho, Kan., La., Mass., Me., Md., Mlinn.,
N. H., Neb., Okla., Ohio, Penn., R. I., Tenn., Utah, Va., IV. Va., and Wis. The retail
mark-up required is 4% in Penn., 5% in Aid., 7% in W. Va., 8% in Idaho and Minn., and
12% in Ariz. Minnesota also encourages a 15% mark-up by declaring sales above that
figure are not violations. The effect of forcing the seller to prove a lesser mark-up than the
statute presumes is similar to the presumptions of intent arising from a sale or advertise-
ment. Sez note 84 supra. Only North Dakota has neither a presumed percentage nor a cost
survey; costs protected appear to be only invoice costs plus delivery charges.
91. See § 17029 of the California Act. And see note 18 supra.
92. Sections authorizing cost surveys as proof of costs exist in the statutes of the 9
states listed in note 87 supra, plus Ohio and Michigan. Ohio combines the cost survey vith a
presumed mark-up of 6% for retailers and 2% for wholesalers; Oregon provides a 6% retail
mark-up for food retailers in addition to the cost survey.
93. If the merchant fails to produce invoice records on the ground of self-incrimination,
wholesalers' shipment records can be used to establish invoice cost. Mering v. Yolo Grocery
& Meat Market, 53 Cal. App. 410, 127 P.2d 985 (1942). Several statutes specifically provide
that manufacturers' list price less published discounts will constitute invoice cost, at least to
establish a prima facie case.
The cost survey (or statutory) percentage must apparently be added to all items and
departments, without exception for fast-moving goods on which a lower mark-up might
well be made. GRE=THR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 364-5; accord, McFadden Lambert Co. v.
Wnrmston & Newell, 209 Minn. 242, 246, 296 N.W. 18, 19 (1941).
94. The danger that cost surveys would be manipulated by trade groups to achieve an
"average" cost that guaranteed standard prices was early appreciated (Tagsart, Th~e Es-
tablished Cost Survey, 20 N.A.C.A.BULL. 145 (1938) ), and several requisites were cuggested
to be met before such surveys were given evidentiary weight under the Acts. Tags-art, The
Cost Principle in Minimum Price Legislation 179, 182 (S U. op Micn. Bus. STrrmS No. 3,
1938). But there is every indication that trade associations have a free hand in conducting
their "surveys" and concluding what their members' "costs" are. The initial cost survey
made by the Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California consisted of a questionnaire
addressed to members which read:
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Under both types of statute, elaborate provisions are made as to the
legitimacy of deducting various discounts or taking advantage of bargain
purchases,95 and the necessity for adding various expenses, whether or not
they are actually incurred, 6 in arriving at invoice cost. Several statutes also
forbid premiums and gifts. 7 As under the NRA codes, an exception con-
"Based on my total grocery sales for the year 1936, I find that my minimum
cost of doing business is -% of my net sales."
and the next year's form suggestively read:
"Based on my total grocery sales for 1937, I find that my minimum cost of do-
ing business has increased approximately -% over my previous cost.. .."
TANNENBAUM, op. cit. supra note 13, at 50, 51. This survey, which resulted in establishing
an 8% mark-up in the area for 1937, was "quite successful in avoiding price wars." Ibid.
And in San Francisco, a minimum mark-up of 8% in 1938 was determined by the Retail
Grocers Assoc. on the basis of a post card questionnaire sent to "various members." FTC,
REPORT ON REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 855 (1945). Tobacco wholesalers in Northern
California increased their percentage mark-up from 3% (as under NRA) to 4% on the basis
of records kept by their association secretary "in a little black hook." Id. at 863.
Instances in which cost surveys have been refused by the courts suggest the extremes
to which they have been carried. In Civic Ass'n of Wyo. v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo.
213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941), the court rejected as self-serving a survey made, aifter litigation
against the price cutter had begun, by competing petroleum dealers who called themselves
the "Civic Association." The survey was based on 27 returned questionnaires, 14 returns
having been rejected, and it found costs to be 26% of net sales. Note the NRA experience
with cost surveys to establish minimum prices, such as that conducted in the paint and
varnish industry, where 160 out of 2000 firms were questioned, 34 out of 74 replies were
rejected, and the remainder formed the basis for the price established. WILcox, op. cit.
supra note 23, at 261. And in Johnson v. Farmer, 41 Cal. App. 2d 874, 107 P.2d 959 (1940),
even the California court balked at a cost survey for photoengraving which was actually a
national uniform cost list, published in 1932 by the American Photo-Engravers Association
as a "Standard Scale" for fixing prices. In State v. Sutton, 2 Wash.2d 523, 98 P.2d 680
(1940), the court, refusing to uphold an injunction to restrain sale of tobacco products below
the "cost survey" level, found the survey itself antagonistic to the stated purposes of the
Act. "The statute does not ...provide," it declared, "that ...merchants of any
class may set prices to which all other merchants must conform." (Italics added.)
Many statutes require that the cost survey be for the "area" or "locality" in which the
alleged violator does business. Cf. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 83 (D.C.
Minn. 1938). But when the Montana court in R. R. Commr's v. Sawyers' Stores, 114
Mont. 562, 138 P.2d 964 (1943), refused to accept a state-wide survey, the legislature
promptly amended the act to make such a survey acceptable (Laws of 1945, c. 21), thus
demonstrating the importance tttached to the cost survey as a method of insuring price
uniformity.
95. Such provisions, commonly excluding purchases made at forced sales and bank-
ruptcy liquidations, are similar to those found invalid in the Arizona and Maryland Acts,
see note 77 supra, which did not allow the price cutter to justify his costs by proving pur-
chases which his competitors could not duplicate. This prohibition against passing on the
advantage to the consumer was first countenanced, but then disallowed, by the NRA uni-
form accounting regulations, see note 57(a) supra.
96. Delivery costs from the wholesaler are commonly specified at a certain percentage
of invoice cost. These must be included in cost calculations even if a retailer buys direct and
does not pay them. Utah Atty. General's Opinion, Dec. 3, 1946, CCH TRADE REG, SERV.
'44-47 Dec. 57,520.
97. Some statutes prohibit gifts directly (e.g., Colorado; California, see Food & Groc.
[Vol. 57 : 391
SALES BELOW COST PROHIBITIONS
tained in many of the acts seems to permit a seller to meet the lower prices
of a competitor without being guilty of violation, 9S but often one who relies
on this excuse for price reductions must take the risk that his competitor's
prices are not themselves in viQlaton of law.P
Much of the effectiveness of the legislation in policing prices rests on
provisions permitting injunctive relief against threatened price reductions, 1' 3
and allowing suit to be brought by any injured party 101 or, under some
statutes, by anyone at all, whether or not he has been or may be injured by
Bureau v. Blue and Gold Stamps, 2 P-H TRADE & IND. SERV. 97,153 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1941) ) while others appear to prevent a gift of one item, contingent on the purchase of
another, by requiring that each item in a combined sale be subject to the cost definitions of
the act. See the Mass. statute, supra note 76, § 14E(c). Although the 1isconsin act formerly
contained an approximately similar requirement, and the Attorney General had ruled that
contingent gifts of merchandise were forbidden, since the gift item was obviously sold below
cost (2 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 8948.11 (1945)), it was held the act did not have this
effect. State v. Tanker Gas, 26 N.W.2d 647 (Wisc. 1947) (gift of 2 gallons of gasoline to
purchasers of 7 gallons did not offend the act unless the price for which 7 gallons were sold
was below cost of the entire 9 gallons). But the legislature promptly revised the act so that
"the price of each item" is "subject to the requirements" of invoice cost plus 67. Laws of
1947, c. 23; see 2 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 8948.001 (1947).
State legislation prohibiting use of trading stamps has been held "due proces" under
the 14th Amendment, Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342 (1916), but the Michi-
gan court held invalid part of its Unfair Practices Act which wss applied to prevent gifts of
premiums with the sale of gasoline. People v. Victor, 287 'Mich. 506, 283 NAV. 666 (1939);
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Prosecuting Att'y of Kent County, 287 Mich. 555, 283 NA.
686 (1939). And Massachusetts has found unconstitutional, as an arbitrary interference
with business, a provision in its Motor Fuel Sales Act, MAss. Amn. LAWs, c. 94, § 295A-0
(1946), which, while it did not govern retail prices, forbade premium gifts which amounted
to a concealed reduction in the stated price. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307
Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940), 131 A.L.R. 1254 (1941). The attempt to prevent pre-
miums, gifts and trading stamps is not, of course, an expression of the cost protection prin-
ciple, but it serves equally well to prevent deviations once a uniform price structure has been
established.
98. Exception is also frequently made for sale of perishable or damaged goods, and
sales to charitable institutions, etc.
99. See TANNENBAum, op. cit. supra note 13, at 55. One who cuts prices to meet thoze
of his rival has been said to have the burden of justifying his competitor's prices. MinnLsota
Att'y General's Opinion, 2 CCH TRADE REG. SERv. 8428.40 (1941). Contra: State v.
Sears, 4 Wash.2d 200, 103 P.2d 377 (1940). But if the illegality of the competitors prices
is apparent, rivals cannot meet them, but must follow remedies given by the act. Better
Business Bureau v. Consolidated Appliance Dealers, 2 P-H TiRADE & IhD. SER. 97,083
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1940). The Kansas Act specifically lays on a price cutter the burden of
proving his good faith attempt to meet competition.
Many of the Acts make exception for duly advertised bona fide closing-out sales, allow-
ing them to take place below cost. Competitors cannot meet such prices, though they rea-
sonably believe the closing-out is not bona fide. Sontag Drug Co., 2 P-H TRADE & I..
SERV. 96,609 (Cal.) ($1,000 in fines imposed).
100. 22 statutes permit injunctive relief.
101. 18 statutes allow any person or corporation injured, or threatened with injury, to
seek relief.
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the actual or threatened violation. 1°2 Action against the price-cutter may
therefore be immediate and direct, with refined arguments as to the level of
costs reserved for the litigation to follow, and a trade association or parallel
private body may constitute itself an effective agency to enforce the law. 3
Further increasing the effectiveness of the legislation is the fact that penal-
ties for violation are serious,0 4 and the difficulties of overcoming presump-
tions of cost or the results of cost surveys are great; 105 thus, the mere threat
of litigation is probably the principal method of the acts' enforcement. 00
Viewed in light of the general analysis of the cost protection theory set
out above,' several years of experience under the statutes reveal them as
102. California's act, supra note 76, § 17070, permits "any person or trade association"
to bring an action, and five other statutes are similar. No allegation of irreparable harm or of
actual damage need be made. Food & Grocery Bureau v. Smith Metropolitan Market Co.,
2 P-H TRADE & IND. SEnv. 96,608 (Cal. Super Ct. 1939). And see Heffelfrmger v. Safeway
Stores, 2 P-H TRADE & IND. SERV. 97,087 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1940). Contra: Eckdahl v.
Hurwitz, 56 Wyo. 19, 103 P.2d 161 (1940).
103. Idaho, Kan., N. H.,. and N. D. provide for proceedings to be brought by public
officers. Other statutes permit district attorneys and attorneys general to bring actions to
restrain violations, while they 'also give private persons the same power. And see note 112
infra.
104. 26 acts contain criminal penalties. A few make void contracts which violate the
law, and some provide that offending corporations may lose their charters. Eight states also
award treble damages to an injured plaintiff.
105. The price cutter who attempts to justify his prices, by claiming costs lower than
those presumed in the statute or cost survey, is in a difficult position. The flexibility of cost
accounting procedures (notes 13-15 supra), instead of making it easier for him tojustify
his prices, seems to give greater strength to plaintiffs, for they can argue that the violator's
accounting justifications are merely self-serving measures. Thus defendant in Dikeou v.
Food Distributors Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940), accused of selling tobacco
products at a price below his "cost of doing business," attempted to show that his cash sales,
which had been challenged, could be profitably made below the mark-up established in tie
cost survey, while his credit sales carried higher costs. Held: his accounting justification was
"in bad faith," having been undertaken after litigation began, and the cost survey, repre-
senting a reasonably approximate distribution of costs, would prevail. Cf. State v. Zimmer-
man, 2 P-H TRADE & IND. SERV. 97,164 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1941), where defendant estab.
lished his cost as 16% of sales though the survey showed 21%-37%.
Probably few except the larger merchants are even equipped to begin a defense when
accused of sales below cost, because their cost records are not precise, see Taggart, The Cost
Principle in Minimum Price Legislation 158 (8 U. OF Mxcn. Bus. STUDirs No. 3, 1938),
and the expense of enlisting expert issistance in proving their "real" costs is heavy.
106. Direct warnings to retailers who advertised products below desired price levels
were one of the principal weapons of the Connecticut Food Council. (See United States v.
Conn. Food Council, Civ. Action No. 680 (D. Conn. Nov. 5, 1941) ). The Food Trades In-
stitute in San Francisco kept close watch on all food prices and promptly required low prices
to be raised. FTC, REPORT ON RESALE Piuca MAINTENANCE 855 (1945). The threat of
litigation was also the most effective force behind the NRA sales-below-cost prohibitions and
state fair-advertising statutes. MACK, op. cit. supra note 55, at 216-24, 445-8.
The effectiveness of such threats in enforcing the Unfair Practices Acts may account for
the comparatively small number of litigated cases.
107. See pp. 396-402 supra.
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particularly undesirable. Although the statutes state as their purpose the
protection of free competition, and the courts have generally agreed that
they are intended "to prevent monopolies," 103 "to prohibit destructive
competition," "' or "to prevent anarchy in commerce," "I the record has not
shown their sanctions applied to protect small sellers against large-scale
campaigns of underselling; ill on the contrary, the laws have been used
primarily by trade associations and larger units "- in order to prevent local
price cutting and to enforce the disciplined system of price leadership which
these units desire to establish. Moreover, there is some evidence that the
acts have been utilized as a means of raising prices.11 3
108. Heffelfinger v. Safeway Stores, CCH TrE REG. SERV. (8th ed. Supp.) 25,503
(Colo., 1940).
109. State v. Zimmerman, 2 P-H TRA.DE & IND. SERV. 97,164 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1941).
110. Better Business Bureau v. Shuttles, 87 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
111. The suit in which a prominent chain-store is named defendant or is found in viola-
tion of a statute can hardly be discovered. In one (unreported) case, an organization of large
retailers sought an injunction against A. & P. in the California court, but suit was withdrawn
when an action was instituted in the federal court challenging the California Act as a burden
on interstate commerce. FTC, REPoRT ON RESALE PRIcE ,1==ENvAcE 8-0 (1945).
During the period when, as shown in United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co.,
67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946) the entire New England division of A. & P. was selling at an
overall loss in order to build volume, A. & P. was not prosecuted under Acts of any of the
New England states for violations; it joined with First National Stores and other large
wholesalers to enforce the Acts through Food Councils operating in Connecticut, Masa-
chusetts, Maine and Rhode Island. 2 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. (9th ed.) 8348.15, 8748.10-
40 (1941); United States v. Conn. Food Council, Civ. Action No. 6S0 (D. Conn. Nov. 5,
1941; consent decree).
112. See, e.g., the sponsorship of the New England Food Councils, supra note 111. In
California, the Food Trades Institute (San Francisco), the Food Industry Bureau (Oakland),
and the Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern California (Los Angeles), were formed to
enforce the Act and were all supported by the chains and other large distribution interests.
FTC,- REPORT ON RESALE PsucE M.INTEN.u cE 854-6 (1945). Tobacco and liquor en-
forcement agencies had similar backing. Id. at 863, 867-9. And see the abortive attempt of
dominant building material supplies to utilize the Act to enforce a 20% price increase. Met.
District Material Dealers Ass'n v. Eastside Bldg. Materials Co., 2 P-H TRADE & IND. SERV.
97,078 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1940). It would seem that the consumer pays for costs of enforce-
ment: the Washington Attorney General has approved a tariff of one-cent per carton on
cigarettes to finance an enforcement agency established by wholesale grocers and tobac-
conists (see 2 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 8909.40 (1940) ); and in Los Angeles, canned mill:
consumers were selected to bear enforcement costs, amounting to one cent per case. United
States v. Food & Grocery Bureau, 43 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.Cal. 1942). The formation of en-
forcement agencies has been avoided in Montana by resting enforcement powers in a com-
mission; but its subservience to cost protection purposes is indicated by its practice of ap-
proving any cost survey signed by three-fourths of the members of a trade. GREurE, Op. cit.
supra note 3, at 367. Louisiana has also recently created a Board of Trade Relations to en-
force its Act, but "any person" threatened with damage may still bring an action to enjoin
violation. And although Utah has given its Trade Commission enforcement powers, "any
person," whether injured or not, may seek an injunction.
113. In the San Francisco area, cost surveys successively raised the required mark-up
from 6% in 1937 to 10% by 1940, when there was agitation to raise it to 12%. Each of these
increases was enforced in higher prices, and grocers who opposed them were unable to gain a
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CONFLCT BETWEEN THE STATUTES AND FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAwS
But the success of the statutes may prove only temporary. For, to the
extent that such statutes constitute a form of private regulation of the market
rather than state regulation, they may run afoul of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits private restraints of trade affecting interstate commerce.114 Al-
ready the FTC and the Anti-trust Division of the Justice Department have
made successful moves against private enforcement activities in several
areas.
Western Confectioners Association: An example is provided by the FTC
proceedings in regard to the Western Confectioners Association.' This
group of candy makers and sellers, holding a- dominant position in ten
western states, undertook to enforce the California Unfair Practices Act in
the candy trade. The association's first step was to make the usual cost
survey.
The resultant enforcement activities, though apparently noimal under
the statute, appeared to the Commission to be a program of "aiding and
abetting in instituting court proceedings against manufacturers selling at
prices below the costs" 116 found by the Association's survey, and of "dis-
seminat(ing) threats . . . that any manufacturer who sold below the cost
figures adopted would be prosecuted under the . . . Act." 117 Prices, the
Commission found, had been stabilized and increased through the Associa-
tion's program. The Commission, therefore, found Western Confectioners
in violation of Section 5 of the Trade Commission Act,"'8 and ordered an end
to price fixing and attempting to "coerce other manufacturers by threats
of legal action or otherwise, to maintain uniform and minimum prices." 119
But although the Commission found an intent in the Association's "con-
spiracy" to make the cost survey a basis for minimum prices, it did not
hearing. FTC REPORT, at 856. And see Findings in Western Confectioners Asso'c., 34
FTC 1431 (1942), as to effect on prices. An FTC comparison of prices charged by chains
operating both in Virginia, where the Act provides an 8% mark-up (6% retail, 2% whole-
sale), and in the District of Columbia, where no such act applies, found Virginia prices
consistently higher. FTC REPORT, at 866. But cf. Grether, The FTC vs. Resale Price Main.
tenance, 7 J. OF MARKETING 1, 4 (1947), who calls the survey "inconclusive." See also
note 94 supra. It may be noted that while supporters of resale price maintenance have
argued that some prices are reduced by its requirement of a stated, advertised price, no such
claims can be made for the unfair practices legislation.
114. Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U. S. 457 (1941); Parker v. Brown, 317
U. S. 341 (1943).
115. 34F.T.C. 1431 (1942).
116. Id. at 1441. It appears that the association encouraged members to litigate as well
as proceeding in its own behalf.
117. Ibid.
118. This finding resulted despite the efforts of twenty-seven attorneys who appeared
for the defense.
119. Id. at 1457-8. A similar order was issued against liquor distributors whose opera-
tions under the Unfair Practices Act in California were viewed as price fixing. Wholesale
Liquor Distributors' Ass'n of No. Calif., 31 F.T.C. 1453 (1940).
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allege or find fraud or misrepresentation in the survey itself.r-' Nor were
enforcement measures, taken after the survey became "established," shown
to be different or in any way more restrictive than what appear to be the
expected, necessary methods of trade associations in enforcing the California
statute. Certainly warnings to an alleged violator of the law are not in
general disapproved, where some genuine cause of action does exist. Yet
the Commission, with good reason, found that such wNarnings by this Asso-
ciation were part of a scheme to set minimum prices and were therefore un-
lawful. It denied to the Association the ability to use the California statute,
for the apparent reason that the use already made had succeeded in realizing
the statute's objectives. If it is assumed there is a sphere of activity which
the Association could have legitimately pursued under the Commission's
standards, while still fulfilling the role of cost surveyor and plaintiff which
the Act created for such a trade association, it is hard to see where this de-
fendant went beyond that sphere. For nothing which it did was offensive to
the California statute or beyond its contemplation; lesser activities would
have left the statute without effect in the confectionery field. In the Com-
mission's view, the central element of illegality was the demonstrated intent
to utilize the California statute to stabilize the market and establish mini-
mum prices. But this aim seems clear in the statute itself and in its whole
enforcement machinery; in effect, then, the Commission found the state
statute restrictive when it condemned the practices of this Association.
The New England Food CounCils: 121 A similar history is revealed in con-
sent decrees filed in Justice Department actions against the New England
Food Councils, except that the statutes these Councils enforced did not
authorize the cost survey, but required a fixed mark-up unless the seller
proved a lesser cost. The Connecticut Council, for example, brought ac-
tions against violators, warned grocers against violation, and published
current minimum prices which would comply with the law. It also assisted
grocers in establishing standards and methods of computing costs of doing
business.12 2 The Government alleged that the Council was a price-fixing
120. The Commission noted that the purpose of the survey was revealed to the mem-
bers, but it did not stress this point or mention it in the order. Compilation of the surveys
was made by a separate tabulating agency. Western Confectioners Ass'n, 34 F.T.C. 1431
(1942).
121. United States v. Conn. Food Council, Civil Action No. 680 (D. Conn., Nov. 5,
1941) (Consent decree); United States v. Mass. Food Council, 2 P-H TADE & IND. SERv.
127,460 (D. Mass. 1941); United States v. Maine Food Council, 2 CCH TR,%E REG. SERv.
8348.15 (D. Mle. 1941); United States v. R. I. Food Council, 2 CCH T&aOEREG .SERv.
8748.10-40 (D. R. I. 1941). See also, United States v. Washington Wholesale Grocers
Assoc., CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 1941-43 Supp. 1 52,837 (W.D. Wash. 1942); United States
v. Washington Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Distributors, Inc., Id., 52,846 (W.D. Wash.
1942).
122. The encouragement of uniform accounting methods (see note 18 supra), in addition
to advancing usual aims of cost protection, was probably intended to make it more difficult
for violators (who had adopted the system) to contend that their costs were less than the
six percent statutory mark-up.
19481
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
combination in restraint of trade, and that it "did not intend to promote the
declared purpose of the . . . [Connecticut] Act." 123 The decree dissolved
the Council and enjoined individual and corporate defendants from threat-
ening litigation, suggesting minimum prices, and computing "an average,
normal or uniform cost of doing business , . . or establish[ing] standards or
methods for such computation." 124 Thus, the very cost survey, so vital a
part of the legislation in other states, was forbidden to these defendants,
and, except for individual suits, they were prevented entirely from enforcing
the cost-protection statute or contributing to any organization formed to
"police ...or administer state laws which restrict sales below cost." 128
Here again, the facts strongly suggest that the Council was proceeding in an
unexceptional manner to enforce the statute exactly as it was intended to
be enforced; 126 as a part of this effort, the Council was reasonably seeking to
prevent violations before they occurred. But since its activities constituted
a form of price-fixing, there can be little doubt of their illegality under the
anti-trust laws.'2
The California Anti-trust Cases: 128 A less resounding victory was won by
the Anti-trust Division in actions brought against enforcement bodies in
San Francisco and Los Angeles, where the trade groups themselves and
several of their members were found guilty of violations of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. Considerable evidence in both cases showed a dominant purpose of the
groups concerned to obtain price stability and elevate minimum market
levels.'29 The Los Angeles unit-the Food and Grocery Bureau-followed
123. Complaint, United States v. Conn. Food Council, supra note 121.
124. Decree, United States v. Conn. Food Council, supra note 121.
125. Ibid. The decree also forbade further warnings based on the legal facts that sales
below cost were unlawful, and required statement of thefiction that only sales with an intent
to injure were unlawful.
126. The conclusion that the Council was using and not abusing the Connecticut statute
is supported by statements of counsel who prosecuted the successful test case under the
statute, Carroll v. Schwartz, 127 Conn. 126, 14 A. 2d 754 (1040), and represented the Coun-
cil in the anti-trust suit. Because of the "discouraging ...sanctions of the Federal Gov-
ernment," he is "positive that no group in Connecticut will ever get together again to under-
take enforcement of the Act," while the litigation difficulties are such that "no individual
would undertake the burden of legal procedure." Letter of A. A. Ribicoff to the writer dated
May 5, 1947. Thus, any activity which makes the Act more than a dead letter will collide
with the anti-trust laws, and it is apparent the Act's sponsors did not intend useless legisla-
tion.
127. See note 6 supra.
128. California Retail Grocers & Merchants Ass'n v. United States, 139 F.2d 978 (C.C.A.
9th 1943), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 729 (1944); United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau of
Southern California, 41 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.Cal. 1941), 43 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.Cal. 1942), 43
F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Cal. 1942); Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern California v. United
States, 139 F.2d 973 (C.C.A. 9th 1943). Similar actions alleging price-fi.ing activities under
Unfair Sales Acts were brought in United States'v. Tennessee Retail Grocers Ass'n, 2 CCII
TRADE REG. SERv. 8808.40 (D. Tenn. 1942), (dismissed), and in United States v. Whole-
sale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of Southern California, 1 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 1021.542
(S. D. Cal. 1941, unreported).
129. The San Francisco Food Trades Institute published minimum prices each week,
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prices of some food products from day to day, instructing grocers what to
charge for them."' But the defense in both cases, which was that these
activities were authorized under the California Unfair Practices Act, was a
troublesome one.
131
In the Los Angeles case, Judge Yankwich experienced great difficulty
with this argument.3 2 He recognized that the Bureau was engaged in that
type of trade association activity which constantly seeks to subjugate
market forces to the advantage of competing producers. He quoted, 13 not
from the Supreme Court's Maple Flooring 134 and Cement "I cases, which
gave wide latitude to price supporting devices of the trade associations there
involved, but from the much more strict and realistic holding in the Hard-
wood case,'36 which had condemned all aspects of that association's program.
He reasserted the recent strong position of the Court regarding price fixing
under the anti-trust laws, and declared a violation of those laws occurred
whether prices were agreed upon "at a maximum or at a minimum, or [by] a
formula .. .adopted for arriving at [them]." 13 This led him to a sharp
denunciation of defendant's entire course of conduct in establishing a cost
survey,13 declaring prices which followed the statutory formula, and threat-
ening to prosecute any sales below that level. Yet, he found the statute
itself unobjectionable, 1"9 and this unwillingness to hold the state legislation
based on its cost surveys, as part of a "Price Stabilization Program." Retailers were warned
that "[T]his program has been sanctioned unanimously by the larger grocery operators,"
and "[any violation ...will subject you to prosecution under the law." California Retail
Grocers & Merchants Ass'n v. United States, 139 F.2d 978, 980 (C.C.A. 9th 1943). And see
note 130 infra.
130. United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California, 43 F. Supp. 974,
978 (S.D. Cal. 1942). The agency in one bulletin issued to retailers asked "the entire trade
to sell no brand of Oleomargarine at less than 12, cents per pound. Kindly obzerve this
price at once." In another it showed its hand by urging that grocers use its cost-survey
quotations rather than what they might consider "their own costs"; otherwise, "our price
structure will quickly break down." Id. at 979.
131. The San Francisco case (opinion unreported) found defendants had gone beyond
the scope of the Act, but in what way is not made clear. California Retail Grocers & Mer-
chants Ass'n v. United States, 139 F.2d 978 (C.C.A. 9th 1943).
132. United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California, 43 F. Supp. 974
(S.D. Cal. 1942).
133. Yd. at 978-9.
134. See notes 35, 37 supra.
135. Supra note 36.
136. Supra note 33.
137. United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California, 43 F. Supp. 966,
972 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
138. There was, however, no more specific criticism of the methods or standards em-
ployed in conducting this survey than there was in the Western Confctioners case, supra
note 115. So far as appears, no fraud was practiced.
139. "[A] State may, within its boundary, regulate trade practices, so as to prevent un-
healthy competition." United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau, 43 F. Supp. 966, 972 (S.D.
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inconsistent with the Sherman Act forced him to attempt another answer to
the conspirators' defense. This answer was contained in an extremely vague
passage which certainly leaves much to be decided:
"[The Act is not] a violation of the anti-trust statute. It forbids
certain practices. And had the Bureau limited itself to advising
the Trade, from time to time, as to the manner of complying with
it, had they been satisfied with issuing, from time to time, real sur-
veys to guide persons in fixing their prices, there, probably, would
have been no prosecution." 140
As a result, upon appeal, the circuit court in this case, as in the San
Francisco case, found it unnecessary "to determine whether the enforcement
of the . . . Act [by itself] would violate the Sherman Act." 141 By way of
dictum, however, the court observed that California had held its Act not
to be a price fixing law, but merely a measure to prevent intentional in-
juries to individuals.
4 2
But what realm of activity, it may be asked, is left to defendants by the
district court decision? The enforcement agency still exists; it can enforce
the California statute and, presumably, both prosecute and threaten to
prosecute apparent violators of the law. It cannot post minimum prices
every day, but only "from time to time," to "advise the Trade." It cannot
make biased or artificial cost surveys, but only "real surveys." And these
may still "guide persons in fixing their prices," since they are still presump-
tive evidence of costs under the statute.' 43 The Bureau, therefore, as a con-
victed violator of the federal law, may do everything just a little less, and
with a purer heart, than it did before and "probably" it will not again violate
the law. It may still make use of the statute to obtain by less obvious, per-
haps, but no less effective methods, the uniformity of minimum price, the
protection of costs, and the avoidance of price competition which it was the
purpose of cost-protection legislation to accomplish. Thus, although the
court here recognized the basic conflict between the Bureau's activities and
the federal anti-trust laws, it was apparently unwilling to put an end to the
illegal conduct.
None of these cases squarely faced the issue of whether the statutes them-
selves conflict with the federal anti-trust laws, yet each gives strong indica-
Cal. 1942). He also found defendants' activities in gaining passage of the Act were lawful,
though the prosecution had argued that these constituted part of the conspiracy in restraint
of trade. Ibid.
140. Id. at 980.
141. Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California v. United States, 139 F.2d 973, 974
(C.C.A. 9th 1943). And see note 131 supra.
142. This holding, in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v. National Candy & Tobacco Co.,
11 Cal.2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938), based on the wholly unreal analogy between tile legal pur-
poses of Unfair Practices and resale price maintenance legislation, impliedly admitted the
price-fixing character of the Act. See note 80 supra.
143. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17072 (1944).
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tion that such a conflict does exist. Enforcement of the state statutes results
in the formation of groups of competitors to make cost surveys (under
statutes permitting them),' 44 to suggest price policy, to warn potential
violators, and to bring suit against those who will not toe the price= cost line.
And yet, as all of the above cases recognize, such action constitutes a form of
price-fixing by private agreement. It might be argued that the statutes are a
form of state action exempt from the Sherman Act under the holding of
Parker v. Brown,145 where a state raisin proration program--carefully super-
vised at all stages by state officials-was upheld on the ground that the
Sherman Act applies to private restraints alone. 4 But the instant statutes,
unlike the one considered in Parker v. Brown, represent a form of state ac-
tion far more subject to private manipulation for private purposes, and
might not, therefore, be granted immunity from the Sherman Act.
147
To the extent that such private price-fixing affects interstate commerce-
and there can be little doubt that current doctrine gives wide scope to the
effect of intra-state activities on interstate commerce 14-it is dearly a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.149 And where the necessary effect of a state
144. See note 92 supra. Even where enforcement groups do not conduct cost surveys,
the Connecticut experience shows that the statutes require enforcement bodies to make them
at all effective. See note 126 supra.
145. 317 U. S. 341 (1943).
146. Id. at 350-2.
147. Parker v. Brown may also be distinguished on the ground that the program there
considered had the active assistance of federal officials (see Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1265 (1947)),
whereas the sales-below-cost statutes enjoy no such federal blessing. But see note 157 infra.
For discussion of the effect of Parker v. Brown on analagous state statutes-thoze pro-
viding for compulsory resale price maintenance in the liquor industry--ee Note, 57 YALE
L. J. 459 (1948).
148. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 118 (1941). And See United States v.
WVrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 120 (1942) ("Competitive practices which are wholly
intrastate may be reached by the Sherman Act because of their injurious effect on interstate
commerce.")
In the Western Confectioners and New England Food Council cases, supra notes 115,
121, there was no difficulty in showing interstate commerce was involved. In the California
anti-trust actions, the fact that the restraints involved were imposed on food products at
the end of their interstate journey, in local marketing, was found sufficient to bring them
within the Sherman Act, since the quantity of interstate shipments wvas thereby affected.
United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California, 41 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Cal.
1941), 43 F. Supp. 966,972 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
149. Although private activities prohibiting sales below cost vary from the more com-
mon types of price-fixing agreement, they are within the scope defined in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940), where it was declared that "the placing of a
floor under . . . markets [which] obviously reduces the play of the forces of supply and de-
mand" was a price-fixing activity and was illegal per se. Id. at 167. And it is to be noted
that these statutes, unlike analogous resale price maintenance statutes, have not received
Congressional blessing in an exemption comparable to the Miller-Tydings Act. See note 3
supra.
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statute 110 is to bring it into direct conflict with a pronouncement of Con-
gress, the supremacy clause 151 permits of but one solution: the state statute
must fall.
52
But countervailing factors may forestall this result. The present Supreme
Court is reluctant to invalidate any type of legislative enactment, par-
ticularly a state statute regulating economic affairs, 15 3 though this reluctance
seems to yield to pressing demands to protect the national economy. 1 4
Aided by the well-established rule that, if any reasonable construction of a
statute will render it constitutional, such a construction will be adopted,166
the Court could validate the statutes. For, although enforcement activities
by a group of competitors constitute a "contract, combination, or con-
spiracy" in contravention of the Sherman Act,' the Court could find that
such activity by an individual seeking to prevent intentional "injury" or
"deception" would not fall within the terms of the Act. Furthermore, since
many of the statutes are also (at least by their terms) enforceable by state
officials, 57 the Court would, if it desired, have available a second rationale
for their validation. 5 s
150. That the state statute may be examined in terms of its "practical administration"
see Southern Patific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 766 (1945). And see the importance at-
tached by Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, to the effects of the statute upheld in Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 67 Sup. Ct. 910, 917 (1947), 56 YALE L. J. 1276 (1947);
see also Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 1356 (1947).
151. U.S. CONsT. Art. VI.
152. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148, 154-6 (1942); Hill v. Florida, 325
U. S. 538 (1945). See North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S. 686, 705 (1946); Savage v
Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 529 (1912); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197,
344-7 (1904).
In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1944), insurance
companies subject to state regulatory statutes were found to have conspired in violation of
the Sherman Act. The question whether the statutes themselves conflicted with the Act
was argued, but the claim of conflict was found to be "exaggerated" (id. at 562). Thus, it
seems fairly clear that a statute found to encourage private restraints of trade would be
considered to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
153. Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U. S. 1 (1943);
Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390 (1941); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 (1938). But see Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 1356, 1369-74
(1947).
154. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1146 (1947); Rice v. Board of Trade
of Chicago, 67 Sup. Ct. 1160 (1947), 56 YALE L. J. 1265 (1947); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 (1945).
155. See NLRB v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
156. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1940).
157. The Montana, Louisiana, and Utah statutes, granting at least concurrent enforce-
ment powers to state commissions, might be so viewed. See notes 103, 112 supra.
158. See Parker v. Brown, supra notes 145-6.
But if the statutes were regarded as state action tending to establish market floors,
rather than permission or encouragment for groups of individuals to do so, the question
would still remain whether such state action, though not contrary to the Sherman Act, was
otherwise prohibited. It is unlikely that the 14th Amendment would stand in the way.
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CONCLUSION
The most important expression of the cost protection movement has been
found in generalized prohibitions against sales below cost. Such prohibitions,
in placing the power of cost definition in private hands, enable trade groups,
guided always by a strong economic interest in limiting the play of market
forces, to set effective price floors and to lay a ban on all types of price cut-
ting,-not merely those where the threat of monopoly exists. Defeated
within the NRA and the FTC Trade Practice Conferences once their results
were observed, such restraints are now sanctioned by state law and their
application may well become more widespread.' The sponsorship, provi-
sions, construction and enforcement of these laws demonstrate that their
avowed purpose of staving off monopoly is not and will not be served, but
that the historic goals of cost protection are well achieved. Under the cloak
of their protection, competitors engage in actions directly affecting market
prices which, if not justified by their provisions, would offend the anti-trust
laws as now construed. If this economic reality can be perceived behind the
ostensible goals of these statutes, state cost-protection legislation may
possibly be viewed in a future Supreme Court test-already long postponed
-as unconstitutional because in direct conflict with laws of the United
States. In any event, continued prosecution of private enforcement groups
by federal agencies would seem to be required if the ground already lost to
anti-competitive forces is to be regained.
rPc~mpi H. LOvLLt
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 529 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.
379 (1937). But it is possible, with expanded notions of what is interstate commerce, see
note 148 supra, that such state price-fixing might be viewed as a burden on that commerce.
Mr. Justice Black's views, J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 316
(1938); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U. S. 176, 183 (1940) are not those
of the majority, and if, in accommodating state and national interests, the court finds the
restraint on interstate commerce sufficiently serious, the statutes might be invalidated.
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946); South-
ern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 (1945). And see Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in
Duck-worth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390, 400 (1941). But cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341,
359-68 (1943) (raisin production control program, though affecting interstate commerce,
was "appropriate" state regulation).
159. GRETHER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 397, predicted that such "horizontal control
devices [might] be merely the stepping stones to larger ventures." And if, as its supporters
seem to fear, resale price maintenance is endangered by the possible repeal of the Miller-
Tydings Act supra note 3, see N. Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1947, p. 35, col. 1, the impetus behind
that movement might be transferred to sales-below-cost statutes, especially where cost sur-
veys allow percentage mark-ups to be established which are appropriate to the drug trade
and others.
t Member, third year class, Yale School of Law.
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